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Who Killed the Friendly Settlement?
The Decline of Negotiated
Resolutions at the European Court of
Human Rights
Gregory S. Weber*
"THE FRIENDLY SETTLEMENT PROCESS IS PERHAPS THE CENTRE-PIECE OF
THE CONVENTION" 1
"[T]HE COURT IS KEEN FOR CASES TO BE RESOLVED...."
2
I. INTRODUCTION
The 2006 documentary film Who Killed the Electric Car?3 examined
the California Air Resources Board's (CARB) 2003 termination of Califor-
nia's zero-emissions-vehicle (ZEV) mandate in the guise of a murder mys-
tery. The filmmakers considered a wide variety of "suspects" who were di-
rectly or indirectly responsible for the agency's decision to end a regulatory
* Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, Sacramento, California.
The author would like to thank research assistants Christina Hitomi, Mary Katherine Staker, and
Leslie Walker for their tireless efforts collecting and organizing material from HUDOC and other
sources. The author would also like to thank Pacific McGeorge Associate Dean Christine
Manolakas for her support and patience. Finally, the author would like to thank Daniel Terris, Di-
rector, and Leigh Swigart, Associate Director, International Center for Ethics, Justice & Public Life,
Brandeis University, for inviting him to participate in the 2003, 2004 & 2006 Brandeis Institutes for
International Judges. Discussions with other participants at those Institutes sparked the author's ini-
tial interest in, and understanding of, the challenges facing the international human rights judiciary.
' L. J. CLEMENTS, NUALA MOLE & ALAN SIMMONS, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS: TAKING A CASE
UNDER THE CONVENTION 75 (2d ed. 1999).
2 PHILLIP LEACH, TAKING A CASE TO THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 71 (2d ed. 2005).
3 WHO KILLED THE ELECTRIC CAR? (Sony Pictures Classics 2006).
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program and effectively kill the large-scale production of electric automo-
biles in the United States.4
A similar documentary on the decline of the "Friendly Settlement"--the
negotiated settlement of cases at the European Court of Human Rights-is
not currently being contemplated by any filmmaker known to this author.
Perhaps a bevy of would-be Hollywood producers and directors are merely
waiting for the program's actual demise. As of the start of 2007, the practice
is still officially alive, with no calls for the Court to emulate the CARB's de-
cision to kill the ZEV mandate. Nevertheless, even the most cursory review
of the Court's case reports shows that the Friendly Settlement is on life sup-
port, after suffering five years of increasingly worsening health.
The Friendly Settlement's decline will likely provoke mixed sentiments
in the international human rights camp. Some may applaud the develop-
ment, including those who believe that only judgments by the Court are
likely to chastise member states sufficiently and to announce standards of
conduct for other states to follow. But others may shed more than a few
mournful tears. An active settlement program can help reduce the Court's
huge case backlog and give complaining parties a faster, and often more
generous, measure of resolution of their personal suffering.
Although Friendly Settlements are appropriate in some circumstances,
discussion of those circumstances and the countervailing arguments are left
for a later date. In light of the scant collected scholarship on this practice, an
initial treatment of the topic should principally be descriptive rather than
prescriptive. Thus, this paper focuses on a detailed description of Friendly
Settlement procedure and practice over the first eight years of the current
Court's existence.
Following this introduction, the paper contains three sections. Sections
II and III are the paper's heart. Section II describes the practice's institu-
tional and textual framework. It includes a detailed examination of the
numbers and types of settlements over the study period-1999-2005-and
the identity of the settling states. It also summarizes the principal scholarly
treatment to date. Section III builds on the general survey of Section II by
examining in detail the settlements under the first two of the convention
provisions that the Court enforces. These include provisions addressing the
right to life and the right to be free from torture and inhuman treatment.
Section IV points the way toward a more normative analysis of the practice.
It begins with a brief consideration of the "prime suspect" in the Friendly
Settlement's near-demise. It concludes with some possible ways for the
4 Suspects included (in alphabetical order) batteries, California Air Resources Board, car companies,
consumers, government, hydrogen fuel cells, and oil companies. SPOILER ALERT: Film conclu-
sion follows. The film concludes with guilty verdicts for all but one of the suspects.
2
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Court or the Contracting Parties to resuscitate the practice from its near-
death experience.
A preview of the paper's overall conclusions will help guide readers to
the discussion that may most interest them. Both in absolute numbers, and
as a relative proportion of the total number of judicial dispositions of appli-
cations, the Friendly Settlement has sharply declined since its peak in 2002
& 2003. 5 This decline has occurred at the same time as the number of judi-
cial decisions has sharply increased. 6 As Section IV briefly suggests, the
two events may well be linked to efforts to streamline the Court's opera-
tions.
7
Little can be directly learned about Friendly Settlements from existing
scholarship 8 or from the language the Court uses to approve them.9 In a few
decisions, however, the Court has indicated criteria by which to judge the
appropriateness of a settlement.'
0
Much can be learned from a study of the settlement patterns themselves.
Overall, the chances of settlement in any given application depend upon a
combination of identity of the respondent state and the Convention article(s)
the applicant raises. The countries with the highest number of judgments
against them are also the countries with the highest number of settlements."i
Some states have never settled a case. 12  Others settle at a substantially
higher-than-average rate. 13 Even those states that settle at a higher-than-
average rate, however, go on to lose an overwhelming majority of the appli-
cations that they do not settle. 
14
As for the relative settle-ability of applications involving particular arti-
cles, no article appears completely off-limits.15 The articles involved in the
largest number of settlements are also the articles involved in the largest
number of judgments.'6 But, everything else being equal, the likelihood of
settlement increases if the application involves articles 2, 3, 5, 12, 14, or one
5 See Table 1.
6 See Table 1.
7 See infra Part IV.
8 See infra notes 132 - 146 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 105 - 110 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 111 - 131 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 87 - 88 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 85 - 86 and accompanying text.
3 See tbls. 1 & 2.
14 See infra notes 176 - 183 and accompanying text.
15 See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
16 See Table 1.
217
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of the Protocols.1 7 Similarly, the likelihood decreases if the application in-
volves articles 8, 9, or 10.18
A detailed survey of settlements and judgments involving Articles 2 and
3 demonstrate that parties are willing to settle applications involving some of
the most fundamental and non-derogable rights. The survey indicates that,
for both Articles, both overall and per-applicant mean and median settlement
values are substantially higher than a recent set of judicial awards.19 Thus,
respondent states are paying a substantial premium to settle cases. The sur-
vey also indicates that for Article 2 applications, mean and median time-to-
settlement, whether measured from the date of the underlying events or the
date of the application's filing, occur substantially faster than the time-to-
judgment for a comparable set of judicial awards.'u The relative rapidity of
Article 2 settlements thus represents an additional premium paid by respon-
dent states to avoid judgment. In contrast, for Article 3 applications, settle-
ments have generally taken longer to reach, whether measured from the date
of the underlying events or the date of the application's filing, than the mean
and median time-to-judgment for a set of recent Article 3 judgments. 2' The
recent availability of more rapid judgments in Article 3 cases may well be
reducing the overall numbers of Article 3 settlements.
As a "who-dunnit," the paper will certainly disappoint Hollywood mo-
guls and legal scholars alike. The title is primarily a tease, but too nice a
conceit to pass up. Its principal utility is to attract attention to this largely
unexamined aspect of international human rights practice. Hopefully it will
succeed as an attempt to begin a dialogue among those particularly inter-
ested in the European Court's important work, and those more generally in-
terested in international human rights courts, even while it fails miserably as
a screen treatment.
II. "FRIENDLY SETTLEMENT" PROCEDURE AT THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS
A. The Court and the Convention: An Overview
The European Court of Human Rights, located in Strasbourg, France,
adjudicates cases arising under the European Convention on Human
'
7 See Table 1.
8 See Table 1.
"See tbls. 2, 2a, 2b & 2c; see also infra notes 189 - 192 and accompanying text.
21 See tbls. 2 & 2b.
21 See infra notes 200 - 204 and accompanying text.
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22 23
Rights. Inspired by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
Convention has been in effect since 1953 in countries that belong to the
Council of Europe. 24  Currently, there are 46 Contracting States located in
Europe and the Caucasus.25
The Convention's 59 Articles are divided into three Sections.26 Section
1, encompassing Articles 2 through 18, guarantees thirteen "Rights and
,,27Freedoms. Section 2, encompassing Articles 19 through 51, establishes
22 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950 Europ.
T.S. No. 005 (as amended by Europ. T.S. No. 155) [hereinafter Convention]. The current version of
the Convention reflects amendment by Protocol 11 (Nov. 1, 1998). Additionally, Protocol 14,
adopted May 13, 2004, has currently been signed by all of the Contracting States. As of Sept. 25,
2006, it has been ratified by all but three of the Contracting States: Poland, Russia, and Turkey. See
Council of Europe, Chart of Signatures and Ratifications (2004), available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=194&CM=8&DF=&CL=ENG (last
visited Sept. 25, 2006).
23 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, United Nations General Assembly (Dec. 10, 1948). See
The European Court of Human Rights, The Court: Historical Background, (Sept. 2003), available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/The+Court/The+Court/History+of+the+Court/ (last vis-
ited Sept. 25, 2006).
24 The Council is "Europe's oldest political institution." Council of Europe, The Council of Europe
in Brief (2004), available at http://www.coe.int/T/e/Comabout-coe/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2006). It
is composed of 5 institutions: 1) the Committee of Ministers; 2) the Parliamentary Assembly; 3) the
Congress of Local and Regional Authorities; 4) the Commissioner for Human Rights; and 5) the
European Court of Human Rights. The Council is a different entity entirely from the Council of the
European Union. Id.
25 Council of Europe, The Council of Europe in Brief: Member States (2004), available at
http://www.coe.int/T/e/Con/about coe/ (last visited Apr.. 10, 2007). These include: Albania, An-
dorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland,
Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Netherlands, Nor-
way, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United King-
dom. Belarus, and Montenegro are candidates for membership. Id. (follow "List and map" hyper-
link).
26 Article I precedes Section 1. It states, "The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone
within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention." Conven-
tion, supra note 22, at art. 1.
27 These include: the right to life (Article 2); the prohibition of torture (Article 3); the prohibition of
slavery and forced labour (Article 4); the fight to liberty and security (Article 5); the right to a fair
trial (Article 6); a prohibition of punishment without law (Article 7); the right to respect for private
and family life (Article 8); freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Article 9); freedom of ex-
pression (Article 10); freedom of assembly and association (Article 11); the right to marry (Article
12); the right to an effective remedy (Article 13); and the prohibition of discrimination (Article 14).
The additional articles of Section 1 address derogation in time of emergency (Article 15), restrictions
on political activities of aliens (Article 16), prohibition of abuse of rights (Article 17), and limita-
tions on use of restrictions of rights (Article 18).
219
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the European Court of Human Rights. Section 3, encompassing Articles 52
through 59, contains miscellaneous provisions.
The Court has the power to issue binding decisions. It can find viola-
tions of the Convention and award "just satisfaction to the injured party." 28
Its judgments are enforceable against member states by the Council of
Europe's "Committee of Ministers."
29
The Court's 46 judges are divided into five sections of nine or ten
judges each. 3° Within the sections, subcommittees of three judges, working
with attorneys from the Court's registry, review an application for admissi-
bility. 31 Chambers of seven judges make final decisions both on admissibil-
ity and, for admissible cases, on the merits. 32 Where requested by a party,
and accepted by five judges, a chamber's decision may be reviewed by the
Grand Chamber, a specially constituted, cross-sectional group of 17
judges. 3
3
Protocols 1, 4, 6 and 7 to the Convention collectively guarantee thirteen additional rights. Protocol I
guarantees: 1) the protection of property; 2) the right to education; and 3) the right to free elections.
Protocol 4: 1) prohibits imprisonment for debt: 2) guarantees freedom of movement; 3) prohibits
expulsion of nationals; and 4) prohibits collective expulsion of aliens. Protocol 6 abolishes the death
penalty. Protocol 7: 1) provides procedural safeguards relating to expulsion of aliens; 2) guarantees a
right of appeal in criminal cases; 3) requires compensation for wrongful conviction; 4) prohibits
double jeopardy; and 5) guarantees equality between the spouses.28Convention, supra note 22, at art. 41.
29 Id. at 46. The Committee of Ministers is composed of the Foreign Ministers of each of the Con-
tracting Parties. Council of Europe, About the Committee of Ministers,
http://www.coe.int/t/cm/aboutCM-en.asp (last visited Apr. 10, 2007).
30 European Court of Human Rights, The Court: Composition of the Sections (2007), available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/The+Court/The+Court/Composition+of+the+Sections/
(last visited Mar. 27, 2007). Judges are elected by the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly.
The overall number of judges corresponds to the overall number of Contracting States. There is no
restriction, however, on the number of judges from the same nationality European Court of Human
Rights, Historical Background, available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/The+Court/The+Court/History+of+the+Court/ (last vis-
ited Apr. 12, 2007) (hereinafter ECHR: Background].
31 The seven principal admissibility criteria include: timeliness; exhaustion of domestic remedies;
anonymity; substantial identity with a prior matter; manifest ill-foundation; incompatibility with the
Convention and its protocols; and abuse of the right of application. See Convention, supra note 22,
at art. 35. See generally LEACH, supra note 2, at 113-160; KAREN REID, A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE
TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 23-34 (2d ed. 2004). Under Protocol 14, single
judges will be able to review admissibility issues. Protocol 14 to the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Amending the Control System of the Convention,
Article 7 [hereinafter Protocol 14].
32 Under Protocol 14, chambers may be reduced to five judges. Protocol 14, supra note 31, at art. 6.
33 Convention, supra note 22, at art. 43. The Grand Chamber includes, ex officio, the Court's Presi-
dent, its Vice-Presidents, and its Section Presidents. Rules of Court, European Court of Human
Rights, Rule 24(a) (July 2006) [hereinafter Rules of Court]. In addition:
Where a case pending before a Chamber raises a serious question affecting the interpretation of the
Convention or the protocols thereto, or where the resolution of a question before the Chamber might
6
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B. The Court's Caseload and Streamlining Efforts
Over the last 25 years, the Court's caseload has 3rown dramatically.
The increase has reflected both the increased number of Member States
and the increase visibility of the Convention in longstanding Member
States. 35  In 1981, the Court saw only 404 applications registered.3 6  By
1997, however, the number had increased almost twelve-fold to 4750.
Eight years later, in 2005, it had increased almost another twelve-fold, to
35,400.
Even more telling has been the Court's growing case backlog. In 1997,
the Court was seeing over 12,000 unregistered cases lodged annually.3 9 By
2005, 45,000 new cases were being lodged annually - almost 1000 new
cases per year per judge.4° While each year, the Court has been able to dis-
pose of a substantial number of cases, either judicially or administratively, 4
1
the number of cases filed continues to exceed the number of cases re-
42solved. As a result, at the end of 2005, there were 81,000 cases pendingbefore the Court, including 56,800 awaiting judicial review in subcommittee
have a result inconsistent with a judgment previously delivered by the Court, the Chamber may...
relinquish jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber, unless one of the parties to the case objects.
Convention, supra note 22, at art. 30.
34 Since 1990, 21 countries of Central and Eastern Europe have acceded to the Council. The Council
of Europe, About the Council of Europe, http://www.coe.int/T/e/Com/about-coe/ (last visited Apr.
10, 2007).
35 The Council of Europe, Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, amending the control system of the Convention: Explanatory Report, 5-
6, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/Html/194.htm (last visited Apr. 10,
2007) [hereinafter Explanatory Report].
36 ECHR: Background, supra note 30.
37 id.
38 European Court of Human Rights, Statistics 2005 (Public Information Document #152053 1) (Ap-
plications allocated to a judicial formation) [hereinafter ECHR 2005 Statistics]. See also Explana-
tory Report, supra note 35, at 7-8.
39 ECHR: Background, supra note 30.
40 id.
41 Judicial dispositions can include final judgments and decisions. The latter include rulings that a
case is inadmissible or is otherwise dismissible. In 2005, there were 28,570 cases resolved judi-
cially. Of these, 958 (3.4%) were resolved by final judgment and the balance by decision. Adminis-
trative resolutions involve destruction of opened files after applicants choose not to pursue the case.
In 2005, there were 14,363 administrative dispositions. ECHR 2005 Statistics, supra note 38.
42 For example, in its Explanatory Report to Protocol 14, the Council summarized the situation in
2003: "Whilst streamlining measures taken by the Court enabled no less than 1500 applications to be
disposed of per month in 2003, this remains far below the nearly 2300 applications allocated to a
decision body every month." Explanatory Report, supra note 35, at 2.
7
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or chamber.4 3 This last figure represented a 14% increase over the start of
44the year.
In light of the increasing caseload and backlog, the Council of Europe
and its member states have twice instituted major reforms. First, the Council
adopted Protocol 11. Effective in November 1998, after ratification by the
requisite number of state parties, Protocol 11 replaced the two previous
Convention institutions-the prior court and the former European Commis-
sion on Human Rights-with a single, full time court operating under a
streamlined procedure.45  Prior to November 1998, an applicant under the
Convention would have first had to proceed before the Commission. The
Commission "had acted as a quasi-judicial, fact-finding and filtering mecha-
nism, its files and hearings not open to the public. It had dealt with the bulk
of applications, applying the admissibility criteria to decide which cases
could eventually be referred to the Court.. ,,4" In addition, the Commis-
sion facilitated case settlement negotiations, dubbed "Friendly Settle-
ments. '4 7  As part of that facilitation, the Commission would frequently
"communicate its provisional view of the merits to the parties, subject to an
obligation of confidentiality., 48  Such a preliminary view, although not
binding on the Court, was nevertheless likely quite influential in encourag-
ing the parties to settle.
43id.
4id.
45 P. VAN DIJK & G.J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 30 (3d ed., 1998). For a general description of the prior Commission's role, see id.
at 26-31, 97-192.
46 See REID, supra note 3 1, at 7. Two other regional human rights systems have maintained a dual-
institution system. They differ, however, over the extent to which they require prior invocation of
their respective commissions. Cases under the American Convention on Human Rights must first be
brought to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Following Commission proceedings,
the Commission can refer cases to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. See generally JO M.
PASQUALUCCI, THE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 6-7 (2003). Similarly, the Organization of African States has maintained the African Com-
mission on Human and Peoples' Rights as a complementary institution to the newly created African
Court on Human and Peoples' Rights. Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 2, available at
http://www.achpr.org/english/_info/court en.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2007). State Parties and
African Intergovernmental organizations can, but do not need to, first bring cases under the African
Convention on Human and Peoples' Rights to the Commission. Id. at art. 5(3). Individuals and
Non-Governmental Organizations, however, can only bypass the Commission if the State Party in
which they reside has authorized such direct applications to the Court. See id. at art. 5(3), 36.
7 VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra note 45, at 178-89.
48 JESSICA SIMOR & BEN EMMERSON, HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 19.014 (2000). Simor and Emmer-
son continue, "The [current] Court, as a more conventional judicial organ, has not adopted this pro-
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Second, the Council has adopted Protocol 14. Still awaiting final ratifi-
cation, 49 Protocol 14 further aims to streamline case administration before
the Court. Of particular relevance to this Article, it will permit: a) a single
judge to determine admissibility; 50 b) the Court to reduce the size of deci-
sion-making chambers from seven to five judges; 51 and c) the Court to seek
a "Friendly Settlement" at any time after an application has been filed.5
2
C. Friendly Settlement Practice and Procedure
"Friendly Settlements," a quaint-to-American-ears term to describe ne-
gotiated resolutions, are one of the Court's tools for resolving the tens of
thousands of applications lodged with it annually. 53 Settled cases have cov-
ered applications alleging violations of every one of the Convention's thir-
teen guaranteed freedoms. 54  Overall, in the first 8 years of the full-time
49 See CLEMENTS, MOLE & SIMMONS, supra note 1.
50 Protocol 14, supra note 31, at art. 7. This will reduce the number of judges needed to consider
admissibility in three ways. First, a single judge will initially consider the matter rather than a com-
mittee of three judges. Id. Second, the current system requires the committee to reach a unanimous
decision on admissibility. Rules of Court, supra note 33, at Rule 53. If the committee is not unani-
mous, the full chamber must rule on admissibility. Id. at Rule 54. By eliminating the unanimity
requirement, fewer applications cases should have to be ruled on by full chambers. Finally, for those
matters that do require a full chamber review, Protocol 14 permits a reduction in the chambers' sizes
from seven to five judges. Protocol 14, supra note 31, at art. 6.
5' Protocol 14, supra note 31, at art. 6. Article 6 of Protocol 14 states, "[a]t the request of the ple-
nary Court, the Committee of Ministers may, by a unanimous decision and for a fixed period, reduce
to five the number ofjudges of the Chambers."
" Id. at art. 15. Currently, the Court can only seek a Friendly Settlement of cases found admissible.
Rules of Court, supra note 33, at Rule 62(1).
53 In broadest terms, and in order of frequency, the Court's three tools are: 1) judicial decision (mat-
ter inadmissible or case otherwise struck off); 2) administrative dismissal (failure to pursue an appli-
cation); and 3) final judgment. See, e.g., ECHR Statistics 2005, supra note 38. In 2005, there were
27,612 judicial decisions, 14,363 administrative dismissals, and 958 final judgments. Id. Friendly
Settlements are a subset of final judgments. See, e.g., Council of Europe, European Court of Human
Rights, Survey of Activities 2005, 30, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/4753F3E8-
3ADO-42C5-B294-0F2A68507FC0/0/2005 SURVEY__COURT .pdf, (last visited Mar. 27, 2007)
[hereinafter ECHR Survey of Activities 2005]. The Court provides statistics on four kinds ofjudg-
ments: 1) on the merits; 2) friendly settlements; 3) cases struck off; and 4) "other." Id. In 2005,
there were 1040 judgments on the merits; 37 friendly settlements; 18 cases struck off; and 10 "other"
judgments. Id.
54 See, e.g., Binbay v. Turkey, App. No. 24922/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004) (alleging a violation of Arti-
cle 2); Moldovan & Others v. Romania, App. No. 41138/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005) (alleging a viola-
tion of Article 3); Klavdianos v Greece, App. No. 38841/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2000) (alleging a viola-
tion of Article 4); Karakoc v. Turkey, App. No. 28294/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004) (alleging a violation
of Article 5); Jonasson v. Sweden, App. No. 59403/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005) (alleging a violation of
Article 6); Yurtseven & Others v. Turkey, App. No. 31730/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2003) (alleging a vio-
223
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Court's existence, it has settled over 800 applications, averaging roughly
100 per year. 55 This average, however, misleadingly obscures a pronounced
recent trend against settlement. The peak years for settlement were 2000-
2002. In those years, the Court settled 224, 151 and 151 cases, respec-
tively. 56  In every year since, the number of settlements has declined. In2005, the Court settled only 40 cases. 57 Initial statistics for 2006 show that
lation of Article 7); Von Hannover v. Germany, App. No. 59320/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005) (alleging a
violation of Article 8); Lotter & Lotter v. Bulgaria, App. No. 39015/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004) (alleg-
ing a violation of Article 9); Taniyan v. Turkey, App. No. 29910/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005) (alleging a
violation of Article 10); Abdulkadir Aydin & Others v. Turkey, App. No. 53909/00, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2005) (alleging a violation of Article 11); Selim v. Cyprus, App. No. 47293/99, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2002-VI) (alleging a violation of Article 12); Badovinac v. Croatia, App. No. 9761/02, Eur. Ct.
H.R. (2004) (alleging a violation of Article 13); Martin v. United Kingdom, App. No. 63608/00, Eur.
Ct. H.R. (2004) (alleging a violation of Article 14). Parties have also settled cases alleging viola-
tions of Article 18, which states, "[tihe restrictions permitted under this Convention to the said rights
and freedoms shall not be applied for any purpose other than those for which they have been pro-
scribed."
In addition, settlements have occurred under many of the additional rights guaranteed under the
Convention's Protocols. See, e.g., Calislar v. Turkey, App. No. 60261/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006)
(showing a settlement under Protocol 1); Siglfirdingur ehf v. Iceland, App. No. 34142/96, Eur. Ct.
H.R. (2000) (showing a settlement under Protocol 2); Tamer v. Turkey, App. No. 28002/95, Eur. Ct.
H.R. (2003) (showing a settlement under Protocol 4); Sunnetqi v. Turkey, App. No. 28632/95, Eur.
Ct. H.R. (2003) (showing a settlement under Protocol 5).
55 The Court maintains a searchable, on-line database called "HUDOC." On November 20, 2006, a
search for "settlement" in HUDOC's "conclusion" field, with the date restrictions "from 01/01 / 1998
to 31/10/2006" produced a "count" of 817 cases. European Court of Human Rights Portal, HUDOC
Collection, at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (last visited Apr. 11,
2007) (All HUDOC searches described in this paper checked searched: 1) both English and French
documents; and 2) all three of the Court's "importance levels."). Slightly different numbers come
from an examination of the Court's annual "Subject Matter of Judgments" reports. According to
those reports, the Court settled 37 cases in 1999, 224 in 2000, 151 in 2001, 152 in 2002, 128 in 2003,
69 in 2004, and 40 in 2005, for a total of 801 cases. The comparable HUDOC count for that period
is 793 cases.
The discrepancies come from at least two sources. First, the Court uses "different methods of calcu-
lation of unjoined applications dealt with in a single decision ...." ECHR Survey of Activities
2005, supra note 53, at 30 n.1. Second, there are some errors within HUDOC. For example, for
2001, a HUDOC search produces only 23 Article 3 settlements. (HUDOC query (Nov. 16, 2006)
with two restrictions: 1) date (01/01/2001 - 31/12/2001); and 2) article (3). In contrast, the Subject
Matter report for 2001 lists four additional article 3 settlements: Aygordu v. Turkey, App. No.
33323/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001); Cemal v. Turkey, App. No. 31848/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001); Aggul
v. Turkey, App. No. 33324/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001); Ince v. Turkey, App. No. 33325/96, Eur. Ct.
H.R. (2001). A review of each of the full text of each of those cases indicates that the applicants did,
indeed, raise Article 3 claims.
56 Council of Europe, European Court of Human Rights, Survey of Activities 2002 35, available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/ADA993B5-8591-42BA-80F5-
CD26A6E598B8/0/SurveyofActivities2002.pdf, (last visited Mar. 27, 2007) [hereinafter ECHR Sur-
vey of Activities 2002].
57 ECHR Survey of Activities 2005, supra note 53, at 30.
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the downward trend is continuing, and the Court settled less than 25 cases
that year. 58
Research into the friendly settlement practice is hampered by the veil of
confidentiality that hangs over the negotiations. 59 As a result, the focus of
this paper is entirely upon published texts. In particular, the paper draws
upon four principal sources of published information. First, collectively, the
Convention, the Court's rules, and a "Practice Direction" provide the basic
texts that frame friendly settlement practice. Second, as alluded to above, the
Court's annual reports and its on-line database provide a healthy group of
statistics and searchable case summaries. Third, each settlement produces a
judicial decision that outlines the case history, the underlying facts, and the
terms of the parties' judicially-blessed agreement. Finally, although rela-
tively scant, several books and articles by practitioners address settlement
practice.
1. Convention, Rules & Practice Direction
Both the Convention and the Court's rules contain several short provi-
sions that frame settlement practice. Three provisions of Convention Arti-
cles 38 and 39 authorize and regulate friendly settlements. Article 38 ex-
pressly authorizes the Court to "place itself at the disposal of the parties
concerned with a view to securing a friendly settlement of the matter on the
basis of respect for human rights . ,,61 It further requires friendly settle-,, ,62
ment proceedings to "be confidential. Finally, where the parties settle,
Article 39 requires the Court to "strike the case out of its list by means of a
decision which shall be confined to a brief statement of the facts and of the
solution reached.,
63
Four rules of court and one "practice direction" address friendly settle-
ments procedure. Three of the rules reference settlement practice in con-
58 According to HUDOC, in 2006, the court approved only 24 friendly settlements. HUDOC search,
supra note 55 (Jan. 12, 2007) with restrictions: 1) conclusion (settlement); and 2) date (01/01/2006-
31/12/2006).
59 See, e.g., Rules of Court, supra note 33, at Rules 33(1) & 62(2). In researching this paper, the
author conducted several confidential, "off the record" discussions with persons who were involved
in various aspects of friendly settlements. These non-case specific discussions provided some gen-
eral insights into current practice.
60 See, e.g., VAN DIK & VAN HOOF, supra note 45, at 178-92; REID, supra note 31, at 14-15;
LEACH, supra note 2, at 71-77.
61 Convention, supra note 22, at art. 38(l)(b).
62 Id. at art. 38(2).
63 Id. at art. 39.
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junction with other matters. Rule 33 precludes public access to documents
filed in conjunction with settlement negotiations. 64  Rule 43 references the
65Council of Ministers' role in supervising enforcement of settlements. Rule
54A notes that, in cases where the Court communicates its intention to con-
sider both the application's admissibility and its merits simultaneously, the
Court may require the parties to include in their responses any settlement
proposals.66
The fourth rule, Rule 62, is the principal provision addressing settlement
practice. It has four main provisions. First, it authorizes court-facilitated
settlement negotiations only after an application has been declared admissi-
ble. 67 Second, it mandates that the Court's registry "enter into contact with
the parties with a view to securing a friendly settlement of the matter .... ,68
Third, it maintains the confidentiality of the settlement negotiations and af-
firms their inadmissibility "in the contentious proceedings" if the case does
not settle.69 Finally, it requires the Court to verify "that [any] settlement has
been reached on the basis of respect for human rights ... " 7
A "Practice Direction" issued by the Court in 2003 contains the final of-
ficial friendly settlement instructions. Principally concerned with pleading
requirements, the Practice Direction reminds parties of the confidentiality of
settlement proceedings. 7 1  As such, it instructs parties to separate submis-
sions and documents for settlement discussions from the formal written
pleadings filed on the merits of the case. 72  Finally, it reminds the parties
that "no reference to offers, concessions or other statements submitted in
6 Rules of Court, supra note 33, at Rule 33(1).
65 Id. at Rule 43(3).
6 Id. at Rule 54A(l) & (2). As part of its case streamlining efforts, the Court has increasingly com-
bined its decision on admissibility with its decision on the merits. For example, in 2003, the Court
issued a total of 753 admissibility rulings. European Court of Human Rights, Statistics 2004, avail-
able at http://www.echr.coe.intNR/rdonlyres/6A38CB91-965F-4E8A-AB52-
39DC69C4A728/0/COURT_nI323996_vl statistical charts 2004 internet_.pdf (last visited Mar.
27, 2007) [hereinafter ECHR Statistics 2004]. Of these 567 (75%) were announced in separate deci-
sions on admissibility. By 2005, however, only 399 (39%) of the Court's 1036 admissibility rulings
were announced in separate decisions. ECHR Statistics 2005, supra note 38. Instead, over 60% of
the admissibility rulings were combined with a ruling on the merits. Id.
67 Rules of Court, supra note 33 at Rule 62(1). The only exception is where, under Rule 54, the
Court communicates its intention to consider admissibility and the merits simultaneously. In that
instance, the parties can make settlement proposals before the Court rules on admissibility. See id. at
Rule 54A(1). As noted above, however, under Protocol 14, the Court will be able to facilitate set-
tlements "at any stage of the proceedings." Protocol 14, supra note 31, at art. 15.
68 Id. at Rule 62(1).
69 Id. at Rule 62(2).
70 Id. at Rule 62(3).
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connection with the friendly settlement may be made in the pleadings filed
in the contentious proceedings. 73
2. Annual Reports and Case Database
In addition to the texts that officially authorize and regulate settlement
practice, the Court regularly provides information about the settlement pro-
gram's results. This information comes from the Court's annual reports and
HUDOC, its searchable case database. Both the reports and database are
available via the internet.
The most useful information about the friendly settlement program
comes from the Court's annual "Survey of Activities." Among other mat-
ters, these annual reports briefly describe the subject matter of each of the
Court's judgments, including its friendly settlements. 74  In addition, they
provide statistical summaries of the Court's output, including some year-to-
year comparisons. 
75
The annual Surveys confirm that friendly settlements, like judgments on
the merits, have always represented a relatively small portion of the Court's
76overall disposition of applications. Nevertheless, the surveys also show
that in some years, friendly settlements have represented an appreciable por-
tion of the admissible applications resolved judicially. For example, in
2000, the court issued 695 judgments, of which 447 were judgments on the
78
merits.77 Of the 695 judgments, 229 were friendly settlements. This rep-
73
1Id. at 15.
74 See, e.g.,Error! Hyperlink reference not valid. ECHR Survey of Activities 2005, supra note 53,
at 11, 17, 24.
75 See, e.g., id. at 30, 36-37.
76 For example, in 2005, the Court resolved 42,933 applications. ECHR Statistics 2005, supra note
38. Of these, 958 (2.2%) were disposed of by final judgment. Id. A third of the applications
(14,363) were resolved administratively for applicants' failure to pursue their cases. Id. The balance
(27,612) were resolved by judicial decision that the case was either inadmissible or should otherwise
be struck off. Id.
Of the 958 final judgments, approximately 37 represented cases struck off as a result of "friendly
settlements." See ECHR Survey of Activities 2005 at 30. Because multiple applications were in-
volved in two of the judgments, 39 applications were settled in 2005. See Council of Europe, Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, Subject matter of judgments before the Court in 2005, available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/FAF5Dl 23-47A3-42CA-A833-
OC0504A65802/0/SUBJECTMATTER_2005.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2007) (identifying 40
friendly settlements in 2005) [hereinafter ECHR Summary of Judgments 2005].
77 ECHR Survey of Activities 2002, supra note 56, at 35.
78 Id. That year, the majority of both the judgments on the merits and the friendly settlements in-
volved a series of cases from Italy raising similar issues of extreme procedural delays in civil and
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resented a third of the total judgments, and a number more than half that of
the judgments on the merits. Similarly, in 2003, the court issued 703 judg-
ments, of which 542 represented judgments on the merits. 8 In that year,
the court settled 128 cases. 81 This represented nearly a fifth of the total
judgments and nearly a quarter as many as the judgments on the merits.
The annual Surveys, combined with the Court's annual "Subject Matter
of Judgments" reports, also offer some insights into the identity of the set-
tling states and the types of cases that they settle. 82 For example, the ratio of
settled cases to final judgments varies greatly among the different states. In
2005, the five countries with largest number of final judgments issued
against them were Turkey (276), Ukraine (119), Greece (102), Russia (82),
83
and Italy (70). Collectively, these 649 judgments represented 63% of the
Court's 1,032 final judgments that year. At the same time, these five coun-
tries settled only fourteen cases. 84  These fourteen settlements represented
only 38% of the overall settlements that year.
administrative proceedings in violation of Convention Article 6. See, e.g., Council of Europe, Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, Survey of Activities 2001 27-33, 50-52, available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/A7D2BB5 D-7FAB-4F71 -ACB 1 -
AA7A62426804/0/SurveyofActivities2001 .pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2007) [hereinafter ECHR Sur-
vey of Activities 2001]. In 2000, 236 of the Court's judgments on the merits were in cases involving
Italy. Id. at 71-72. That same year, 160 of the Court's 229 friendly settlements were in cases in-
volving Italy. Id.
79 ECHR Survey of Activities 2005, supra note 53, at 33.
8 Id. at37.
81 Id. at 32. HUDOC counts only 127 cases for the period. HUDOC search, supra note 55, with
restrictions: 1) conclusion (settlement); and 2) date (01/01/2003-31/12/2003).
82 As the overall number of settlements has declined greatly in recent years, it is difficult to offer any
statistically meaningful patterns. The following insights are offered as suggestions that might bear
further or more detailed examination over succeeding years.
83 ECHR Survey of Activities 2005, supra note 53, at 36-37 (data taken from column "Judgments
(Chamber and Grand Chamber)"). '
8 Id. The five countries' respective settlements were: Greece (1), Italy (7), and Turkey (6). Neither
Russia nor Ukraine has ever settled any cases.
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Eight states have never settled a case since November 1, 1998.85 While
most of these are states with relatively few judgments against them, at least
two-the Russian Federation and Ukraine-have had a substantial number
of adverse judgments issued against them. 86 As such, they appear to have a
policy against settlement. As Table la indicates, the five countries that set-
tled the most cases between November 1, 1998, and December 31, 2005 are:
Italy (322), !Turkey (174), Portugal (53), France (40), and Poland (32).87
Collectively, these 621 settlements represented over 77% of the 803 total
settlements produced during that period. As Table la further indicates, dur-
ing the same period, these same five countries were parties to final judg-
ments in a total of 2,654 cases: Italy (1191), Turkey (779), Portugal (71),
France (392), and Poland (221). Italy and Turkey, the two countries who
produced the highest number of final judgments, also produced the highest
85 These are: Albania, Georgia, Liechtenstein, Malta, Norway, Russian Federation, Serbia and Mon-
tenegro, and Ukraine.
Curiously, the Court's ECHR Survey of Activities 2002 states that Russia settled one case involving
the length of criminal proceedings. ECHR Survey of Activities 2002, supra note 56, at 20. The
2002 survey tabular data, however, indicates that Russia settled no cases that year. Id. at 29,35. The
ECHR Survey of Activities 2002 further identifies only two judgments of any kind issued against
Russia that year. Id. at 35, 37. A review of the Court's 2002 "Subject Matter Table" identifies these
two cases as Burdov v. Russia, App. No. 59498/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2002), and Kalashnikov v. Russia,
App. No. 47095/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2002). See Council of Europe, European Court of Human Rights,
Subject matter of judgments before the Court in 2002 27, 40, available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/3EC9FA7E-FD8B-4824-9F20-
EDAOF4420C24/0/MicrosoftWordSUBJECTMATTER_2002_TABLE.pdf (last visited Mar. 27,
2007) [hereinafter ECHR Subject Matter of Judgments 2002]. Of these two cases, only the latter
involved the length of criminal proceedings. Both the Subject Matter Table and the full text of the
decision report a violation in a judgment on the merits, not a friendly settlement. Id. at 40; Kalash-
nikov v. Russia, App. No. 47095/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. 32-33 (2002).
86 Since November 1, 1998, the 8 states that have never settled a case have had the following number
of adverse judgments entered against them: Albania (1), Georgia (4), Liechtenstein (3), Malta (6),
Norway (8), Russian Federation (101), Serbia and Montenegro (0), and Ukraine (139).
The absence ofjudgments against the former country of Serbia and Montenegro reflects its relatively
recent accession to the Council of Europe. Serbia and Montenegro official joined the Council on
April 4, 2003 (after the country split into two in 2006, Serbia maintained the Council membership,
and Montenegro became a candidate state). As of the end of 2005, there had been 1345 applications
lodged against Serbia and Montenegro, but only 6 had been referred to the government. ECHR Sur-
vey of Activities 2005, supra note 53, at 35.
87 Data for Table I a was derived from three of the Court's annual Survey of Activities. Data for
2003-2005 can be found on pages 36-37 in ECHR Survey of Activities 2005, supra note 53. Data
for 2002 can be found on pages 34-35 in ECHR Survey of Activities 2002, supra note 56. Data for
1999-2001 can be found on pages 32-33 in ECHR Survey of Activities 2001, supra note 78. In all
three cases, data for "judgments" was taken from the Column "Judgments (Chamber and Grand
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number of settlements. These countries also have substantially higher than
average settlement rates. The ratio of settled cases to final judgments for It-
aly was .27 and for Turkey was .22.88 The percentage of settlements among
total cases (i.e., settlements plus judgments) was 21% for Italy and 18% for
Turkey. 89 In contrast, the average ratio of settlements to judgments for all
countries is .19,90 and the percentage of settlements among total cases for all
countries is 16%.9 1 Thus, however measured, both Italy and Turkey have
higher than average settlement rates.
The settlement to final judgment ratio varied widely among the other
three top settlers: Portugal (.75), France (.10), and Poland (.14). 9 The per-
centage of total cases represented by settlements was: Portugal (43%),
France (9%) and Poland (13%) 93 . France and Poland therefore settle cases at
a below-average rate. Of all the countries that are parties to at least 70
judgments, Portugal is by far and away the most likely to settle a case, with
Ukraine and Russia least likely.
The types of cases settled reveal some interesting patterns as well. As
Table 1 indicates, over the seven years between 1999 and 2005, inclusive,
the two most frequent subjects of judgments on the merits were cases raising
at least one issue under Article 6 (3,177 cases) and cases raising one or more
of the Protocols (864 cases). 94 These two subjects also produced the most
88 See Table la, Col. U ("FS/J").
89 Id. at Col. T ("FS/J&FS").
90 Id. at Col. U ("FS/J")
" Id. at Col. T ("FS/J&FS").
92 Id. at Col. U ("FS/J").
9' Id. at Col. T ("FS/J&FS").
94 See Table 1. Data for Table I was derived from three sources. For 2000-2005, the information
comes from a manual count of the court's annual "Subject Matter" tables. For 1999, the Survey of
Activities and HUDOC provided the information. See Council of Europe, European Court of Hu-
man Rights, Survey of Activities 1999, 35-38, available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/BA4CD581-4E3E-4324-83A6-
1A753F92C1DE/0/SurveyofActivitiesl999.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2007) [hereinafter ECHR Sur-
vey of Activities 1999]. For the eleven cases listed in the ECHR Survey of Activities 1999 for
which the court found no violation, a HUDOC search was performed to indicate the subject matter
of each of those decisions. Id. at 37. That search revealed that six of those eleven cases presented
issues under Article 6 (Garcia Ruiz v. Spain, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. 22 (2001); Waite & Kennedy v. Ger-
many,30 Eur. Ct. H.R. 261 (2000); Beer & Regan v. Germany, 33 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3 (2001); Humen v.
Poland, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. 26 (2001); Escoubet v. Belgium, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. 46 (2001); and Pellegrin
v. France 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. 26 (2001)); two presented issues under Article 10 (Janowski v. Poland, 29
Eur. Ct. H.R. 705 (2000); Rekvenyi v. Hungary, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. 519 (2000); and one each pre-
sented an issue under Articles 5 (Douiyeb v. Netherlands, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. 790 (2000)), 11 (Rek-
venyi v. Hungary, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. 519 (2000)), 13 (Escoubet v. Belgium, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. 46
(2001)), 14 (Rekvenyi v. Hungary, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. 519 (2000)), and a Protocol (Spacek Sro v.
Czech Republic, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1010(2000)). Id.
Regardless of the data sources, for each of the seven years tabulated, the data under the "J" and "FS"
columns represent the total number of individual cases that raised at least one issue under the indi-
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friendly settlements. Thus, the highest number of settlements involved cases
under Article 6 (620 cases) and cases involving one or more of the Protocols
(202 cases). These two subjects also represent virtually identical proportions
of the overall number of both judgments on the merits and friendly settle-
ments-about 70% of both.95
cated Article. Where a particular case listed multiple issues under the same Article, that case was
only counted once for the given article. For example, Kawka v. Poland, App. No. 25874/94, Eur. Ct.
H.R. (2001), is the first case listed in the Council of Europe, European Court of Human Rights, Sub-
ject matter of judgments before the Court in 2001, available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/32FB3D4B-A4A5-4E94-8DA8-
2EF7C8CI55B8/0/MicrosoftWordSUBJECTMATTER 2001 TABLE.pdf (last visited Mar. 27,
2007) [hereinafter ECHR Subject Matter of Judgments 2001 ]. According to the court's table, Kawka
presented two separate issues for judgment under Article 5: one under Article 5, § 1, and one under
Article 5, §4. Id. In Table 1, however, Kawka would only be counted once, i.e., it is one of the 33
cases that year that raised at least one issue in an Article 5 judgment on the merits. Id. Many cases
summarized in Table I, however, raise issues under multiple articles. Id. Each of these multi-article
cases are included once per article. For example, Lunari v. Italy, App. No. 21463/93, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2001) is the tenth case listed in the Court's Subject Matter of Judgments 2001. According to the
court's table, Lunari presented separate issues for judgment under both Article 6 and Protocol I. Id.
Thus, in Table 1, Lunari would be counted twice, i.e., it is both one of the 526 cases that year that
raised at least one issue in an Article 6 judgment on the merits and one of the 156 cases that year that
raised at least one issue in a judgment on the merits involving one or more of the Convention's Pro-
tocols. Similarly, Sahli v. Belgium, App. No. 38707/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001), is the sixth case listed
in the Court's Subject Matter of Judgments 2001. According to the Court's table, Sahli was a
friendly settlement of a case raising issues under both Articles 3 and 8. Id. Thus, in Table 1, Sahli
would be counted twice, i.e., it is one of the 28 cases raising at least one issue under Article 3 that
year that resulted in a friendly settlement and one of the eight cases raising at least one issue under
Article 8 that year that resulted in a friendly settlement.
As a result of the counting conventions used in Table I, the total number of both judgments on the
merits and friendly settlements for any given year exceeds the total number of cases reported by the
court in its annual Survey of Activities as either reaching judgment on the merits or concluding by
settlement. For that reason, and three others, the numbers in Tables I and I a differ. First, Table I
lists as friendly settlements the seven cases in 2000 and the one case in 1999 that the court's respec-
tive "Subject Matter of Judgments" describe as reaching "agreed solutions" rather than "friendly
settlements." ECHR Subject Matter Table 2001 at 8, I1, 13, 14, 27, 30 & 43; Council of Europe,
European Court of Human Rights, Subject matter of judgments before the Court in 2000, 3, avail-
able at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/8CAC8968-OEEI -4DA3-AF2F-
54A56FB21BIA/0/MicrosoftWordSUBJECTMATTER_2000_TABLEeng.pdf (last visited Apr.
4, 2007) [hereinafter ECHR Subject Matter of Judgments 2000]. Second, Table I does not include
either Friendly Settlements or judgments on the merits in cases involving only "just satisfaction"
(i.e., compensation). See, e.g., Brumarescu v. Romania, 33 Eur. Ct. H.R. 36 (2001) (reaching a
judgment on the merits, as summarized in ECHR Subject Matter Table 2001, at 4); Miragall Esco-
lano v. Spain, 34 Eur. Ct. H.R. 24 (2002) (agreeing upon a solution, as summarized in ECHR Sub-
ject Matter Table 2000, at 13). Finally, Table I does not include "revised" judgments, i.e., requests
for reconsideration based on new facts. See, e.g., McGinley & Egan v. United Kingdom, 27 Eur. Ct.
H.R. 1 (1999) (refusing a request of revision, as reported in ECHR Subject Matter Table 2000, at 3).
95 Cases involving Article 6 and one or more of the Protocols represented 71% ((3177 + 864)/5654)
of the judgments on the merits and 69% ((620 + 202)/1192) of the friendly settlements.
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Beyond the top two subjects, the most frequent subjects of judgments on
the merits diverge only slightly from the most frequent subjects of friendly
settlements. For judgments on the merits, the next four most frequent sub-
jects are cases involving Articles 13 (326 cases), 5 (323 cases), 8 (263
cases), and 3 (219 cases). Similarly, these four subjects represent the next
four most frequent subjects of friendly settlements, although in a slightly dif-
ferent order: Articles 5 (104 cases), 3 (84 cases), 13 (60 cases), and 8 (35
cases). 96 Collectively, these top six subjects of both judgments on the merits
and friendly settlements represent over 90% of the court's judgments and
settlements respectively.
97
While the overall judgment and settlement rates of the top six subjects
are similar, there are some deviations from the mean. For those articles that
have at least 100 total cases, the highest settlement rates are represented by
Articles 3 (28%), 5 (24%), and 14 (23%).98 In absolute terms, these are, re-
spectively, 11%, 7%, and 6% higher than the 17% overall average settlement
rate. In relative terms, an Article 3 case is over 65% more likely to settle
than the "average" case, while cases involving Articles 5 and 14 are 41%
and 35% more likely to settle than the "average" case. Similarly, for those
Articles that have at least 100 total cases, the lowest settlement rates are rep-
resented by Articles 10 (10%) and 8 (12%). 99 In absolute terms, these are,
respectively, 7% and 5% lower than the 17% overall average settlement rate.
In relative terms, an Article 10 case is 41% less likely to settle than an "av-
erage" case, while an Article 8 case is nearly 30% less likely to settle.
3. Published Decisions
In addition to the legal texts that frame the court's settlement practice,
its database and its summary of settlements, an examination of the court's
published settlement decisions provides a third source of official documenta-
tion of current settlement practices. Several patterns emerge from such an
examination. In particular, in simplest terms, regardless of the convention
articles involved, settlement decisions follow a standard, five-section struc-
ture.100 The first section identifies the panel of judges who have participated
96 Article 14 also involved thirty-five settlements.
97 Judgments on the merits involving Articles 3, 5, 6, 8, 13 and one or more of the Protocols repre-
sent 91% of the total judgments on the merits listed in Table I :
(219+323+3177+263+326+824)/5654. Friendly settlements involving Articles 3, 5, 6, 8, 13 and one
or more of the Protocols represent 93% of the total settlements listed in Table 1:
(84+104+620+35+60+202)/1194.
98 See Table 1.
99/d.
1oo See, e.g., Sali v. Sweden, App. No. 67070/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006).
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in the decision.10 1 The second section outlines the procedure at the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, from the initial application with the Court to
the date of the decision upholding the settlement. ° 2 It lists the parties, their
representatives, and the grounds for the application. The third section de-
scribes the case facts. 103 The fourth section, titled "The Law," describes the
settlement terms. 104 While some variations exist, the terms usually identify
the compensation, if any, to be given the applicant and any additional under-
takings by the state. In addition, it usually contains the applicant's release of
further claims against the state and both parties' agreement not to request
reference of the case to the court's Grand Chamber. Finally, the fourth sec-
tion contains the Court's Convention-required blessing of the settlement.'
0 5
With virtually unvarying language, the Court states:
[It] takes note of the agreement reached between the parties (Article 39
of the Convention). It is satisfied that the settlement is based on respect for
human rights as defined in the Convention or its Protocols (Article 37 § 1
infine of the Convention and Rule 62 § 3 of the Rules of Court). 106
The fifth and final section simply announces the court's decision to
"strike the case out of the list."' 0 7
Researchers and counsel in other cases benefit from three aspects of the
court's settlement decisions. First and foremost, although the negotiations
that lead to settlements are confidential, the court's decisions themselves are
not. That is, there are no secret settlements. The court discloses the full set-
tlement terms in a public document accessible to anyone with an internet
connection, a CD-ROM reader, or a DVD player. 108 This disclosure helps
researchers and counsel assess the relative value of a settlement. As such, it
should help promote fair settlements. Second, the court's recitation of the
procedural history allows researchers and counsel to evaluate the speed in
which the application moved through the system. This can help observers
appropriately discount the settlement value. Third, the court's detailed reci-




3 Id. at 1-2.
o4 Id. at 2-3.
105 Id.
I06Id. at 3.
107 Id. at 3.
'08 In addition to its on-line version of the HUDOC database, the court sells CD and DVD versions.
Council of Europe, European Court of Human Rights, available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Publishing/HUDOC+CD+and+DVD/HUDOC+CD+Home+page
(last visited Apr. 4, 2007).
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tation of the facts allows researchers or counsel in other cases to compare
cases. Again, this can help researchers and counsel to identify similarities
and differences, and adjust their findings and settlement values accordingly.
In addition, collectively, these three points help assure basic judicial ac-
countability to the public in general and the contracting states in particular.
Researchers and counsel in other cases, however, will find little benefit
from the Court's boilerplate language assessing the settlement's promotion
of human rights. An occasional settlement cites precedent or gives some
analysis to support its conclusion.' 09 In almost all other cases, however, the
Court approves the settlement without indicating its reasons.110 Quite sim-
ply, the court gives no reasons, other than "satisfaction," for approving the
settlement. At best, the court's formulaic language suggests a fundamental
'9 See, e.g., Aydin v. Turkey, App. Nos. 28293/95, 29494/95, 30219/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001) (citing
three prior decisions to support its conclusion that "the settlement is based on respect for human
rights").
Denmark v. Turkey, App. No. 34382/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2000), contains one of the lengthier post-
1999 analyses of the reasons supporting the Court's settlement approval. In it:
[T]he Court observes that the ... agreement... makes provision for the payment of a sum of
money to the applicant Government, includes a statement of regret by the respondent Govern-
ment conceming the occurrence of occasional and individual cases of torture and ill-treatment
in Turkey, emphasises [sic], with reference to Turkey's continued participation in the Council
of Europe's police-training project, the importance of the training of Turkish police officers
and in addition provides for the establishment of a new bilateral project in this area. Further-
more it has been decided to establish a continuous Danish-Turkish political dialogue which
will also focus on human rights issues and within which individual cases may be raised.
The Court also observes the changes to the legal and administrative framework which have been
introduced in Turkey in response to instances of torture and ill-treatment as well as the respondent
Government's undertaking to make further improvements in the field of human rights--especially
concerning the occurrence of incidents of torture and ill-treatment-and to continue their co-
operation with international human rights bodies, in particular the Committee for the Prevention of
Torture. Pre-1999 settlements appear more frequently to refer specifically to prior decisions to sup-
port the Court's conclusion that the settlement is based on respect for human rights. For example, in
Nyberg v. Sweden, 14 Eur. Ct. H.R. 870, 908 (1992), a case involving foster care of the applicants'
child, the Court concluded:
The Court takes formal note of the friendly settlement reached by the Government and the ap-
plicants. In view of its responsibilities under Articlel9 (art. 19) of the Convention, it would be
open to it to disregard this settlement and proceed with the consideration of the case if a reason
of public policy ("ordre public") appeared to necessitate such a course (Rule 49 para. 4).
However, the Court sees no call to do so, having regard to the final reunification of the family
and to its case-law on the matter (see the Olsson judgment of 24 May 1988, Series A no. 130,
and the Eriksson judgment of 22 June 1989, Series A no. 156. Id. at 6 (citations omitted)).
Similarly, in Sur v. Turkey, App. No. 137/1996/756/955, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1997), the Court stated: "in
a number of previous cases [the Court] has settled issues similar to those raised by the instant case
under Article 3 of the Convention [citations omitted]. In so doing, it clarified the nature and extent
of the obligations undertaken in this area by the Contracting States." Id.
"0 Reid notes that the only exceptions are two cases: Tryer v. United Kingdom (decided Apr. 25,
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deference to the parties' rights to self-determination. At worst, however, the
boilerplate language suggests that the Court is minimizing its duty to ensure
that settlements are based on respect for human rights. Particularly in cases
where the respondent state admits no wrongdoing, the settlement's promo-
tion of human rights may not be readily apparent.
While the boilerplate language contained in the standard settlement de-
cision gives little insight into the Court's examination of the settlement's
promotion of human rights, published judgments in cases involving resolu-
tions other than friendly settlements should occasionally reflect the Court's
thinking. Two decisions demonstrate the range of the Court's views.111 In
Acar v. Turkey, the Court rejected Turkey's request that an unaccepted set-
tlement offer be the basis for a judicial decision to strike the case from the
list.112 In contrast, in Akman v. Turkey, the Court accepted Turkey's request,
incorporating Turkey's proposed but rejected settlement terms into its judg-
ment, and struck the case off the list. 113
Akman involved a claim that Turkish security forces had killed the ap-
plicant's son. After friendly settlement negotiations had broken off, the
Turkish government sent the Court a public declaration. In it, using lan-
guage typical for friendly settlements, 1 4 the government declared: 1) its re-
gret for "the occurrence of individual cases of death resulting from the use of
excessive force as in the circumstances of [the applicant's son's] death, not-
withstanding existing Turkish legislation and the resolve of the Government
11 See REID, supra note 31, at 15.
112 Tahsin Acar v. Turkey, App. No. 26307/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. 8 (2004).. See also Togcu v. Turkey,
App. No. 27601/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2002); Haran v. Turkey, App. No. 25754/94, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2002).
113 Akman v. Turkey, App. No. 37453/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001); see also Akbay v. Turkey, App.No.
32598/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001); 1.1. v. Turkey, App. No. 30953/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001). But see
Jeremy McBride, Neither friendly nor a settlement, available at
www.khrp.org/newsline/newsline I5/newslinel 5%20(l).pdf. (criticising Akman, Akbay, and LL).
114 See, e.g., Binbay v. Turkey, App. No. 24922/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004); Yurtseven v. Turkey, App.
No. 31730/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2003); Stinnet~i v. Turkey, App. No. 28632/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2003).
Not all Turkish settlements are as explicit in their acknowledgement of regret and culpability. For
example, in Aggul v. Turkey, App. No. 33324/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001), the agreement simply stated:
I declare that the Government of Turkey offer to pay the amount of 90,000 pounds sterling
(GBP) on an ex gratia basis to [the applicants], with a view to securing a friendly settlement of
the application registered under no. 33324/96. This sum shall cover any pecuniary and non-
pecuniary damage as well as costs, and it will be payable immediately after the notification of
the judgment delivered by the Court pursuant to Article 39 of the European Convention on
Human Rights. This payment will constitute the final resolution of the case.
Id. at 3. See also Cemal v. Turkey, App. No. 31848/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001) (depicting settlement
language very similar to Aggul).
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to prevent such actions"; 2) its acceptance "that the use of excessive or dis-
proportionate force resulting in death constitutes a violation of Article 2 of
the Convention"; and 3) its undertaking "to issue appropriate instructions
and adopt all necessary measures to ensure that the right to life-including
the obligation to carry out effective investigations-is respected in the fu-
ture." 11 It then offered to pay the applicant ex gratia £85,000.11' Finally,
it announced its willingness to accept supervision of the judgment's execu-
tion by the Council of Ministers. 117 Over the applicant's objection, it urged
the Court to strike the case.118
In Akman, the insight into the Court's views comes more from its con-
duct than from its words. The Court based its decision on two provisions of
Article 37, the same article that governs the decision to strike a case follow-
ing a friendly settlement. The Court first cited its authority under Article
37(l)(c) to strike any case out of its list if "for any ... reason ... it is no
longer justified to continue the examination of the application. ' 19 It then
reiterated, however, Article 37(l)'s ultimate obligation to "continue the ex-
amination of the application if respect for human rights ... so requires.'"
1 20
It then stated:
The Court has carefully examined the terms of the Government's decla-
ration. Having regard to the nature of the admissions contained in the decla-
ration as well as the scope and extent of the various undertakings referred to
therein, together with the amount of compensation proposed, the Court con-
siders that it is no longer justified to continue the examination of the applica-
tion ....
Moreover, the Court is satisfied that respect for human rights... does
not require it to continue the examination of the application .... The Court
notes in this regard that it has specified the nature and extent of the obliga-
tions which arise for the respondent State in cases of alleged unlawful kill-
ings by members of the security forces under Articles 2 and 13 of the Con-
vention. 1z1
The Court reached this conclusion despite its acknowledgement that the
applicant claimed that "the proposed declaration omitted any reference to the
unlawful nature of the killing of his son and failed to highlight that his son
15 Akman, at 4-5.
116 Id. at 5.
1171id.
1 " Id. at4.
" Id. at 5 (quoting Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, July
8, 1997 art. 37(l)(c)).
120 Id. at 6 (quoting Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, July
8, 1997 art. 37(1)).
121 Id. at 6 (citations omitted).
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was unarmed at the material time."' 122 In the applicant's submission, the
terms of the declaration did not determine any of the fundamental human
rights questions raised by the application. 123
In Akman, in effect, the Court concluded that Turkey's declaration gave
the applicant at least as good a result as a judgment on the merits would have
given her. It implicitly rejected the applicant's argument that the Court
needed to establish either additional precedent or the historical facts in the
case before it. In contrast, in Acar, the Court's Grand Chamber rejected a
similar conclusion reached by one of the Chambers. Unlike Akman, and in-
deed, because of its need to distinguish Akman, the Acar Court was more
explicit in its reasons for rejecting what is in effect a unilaterally imposed
settlement.
Acar involved responsibility for the forced disappearance of the appli-
cant's brother and the legitimacy of the official investigation into that disap-
pearance. During the pendency of the case before the Court, Turkey prof-
fered a declaration, and a request to strike the case, similar to what it had
successfully proposed in Akman. In it, Turkey declared: 1) its willingness to
pay the applicant £70,000; 2) its regret for "the occurrence of the actions
which have led to the bringing of the present application, in particular the
disappearance of the applicant's brother ... and the anguish caused to his
family"; 3) its acceptance that "unrecorded deprivations of liberty and insuf-
ficient investigations into allegations of disappearance constitute violations
of Arts 2, 5 and 13 .... "; and 4) its undertaking "to issue appropriate in-
structions and adopt all necessary measures with a view to ensuring that all
deprivations of liberty are fully and accurately recorded by the authorities
and that effective investigations into alleged disappearances are carried
out ... ,,124 Finally, it announced its willingness to accept supervision of
the judgment's execution by the Council of Ministers.' The Chamber ac-
cepted the declaration and voted to strike the case from the list. 126 Upon the
applicant's request, the case was transferred to the Grand Chamber. 127 De-
spite the superficial similarity between the declarations in Acar and Akman,
the Grand Chamber overruled the Chamber and reinstated the case.
122 id.
123 Id. at 5.
124 Tahsin Acar v. Turkey, 38 E.H.R.R. 2, 8 (2004).
125 Id.
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In its decision, the Grand Chamber discussed at length the circum-
stances that make appropriate a decision to strike a case off the list.
A non-exhaustive list of relevant factors when considering strike-out in-
cluded the nature of the complaints made, whether the issues raised were
comparable to issues already determine by the Court in previous cases, the
nature and scope of any measures take by the Government in the context of
the execution of judgments delivered by the Court in any such previous
cases, and the impact of these measures on the case at issue. It may also be
material whether the facts were in dispute between the parties, and, if so, to
what extend, and what prima facie evidentiary value was to be attributed to
the parties' submissions on the facts. It was significant where the Court it-
self had already taken evidence in the case for the purpose of establishing
disputed facts. Other relevant factors may include whether any admissions
were made in relation to the alleged violations made and, if so, the scope of
such admissions and the manner in which the respondent State intended to
provide redress to the applicant. 128
Applying these principles to the case before it, the Grand Chamber
noted that: 1) "the facts were largely in dispute between the parties"; 2)
"[Turkey] was not prepared to make any admissions of responsibility or li-
ability"; 3) the unilateral declaration made "[n]o reference.., to any meas-
ures to deal with the specific complaints, or to what pertinent and practicable
measures might be called for in this particular case."' 129  It concluded,
"[a]lthough a full admission of liability could not be regarded as a condition
sine quo non for a successful strike-out application, a unilateral declaration
should contain at least an admission to that effect, combined with an under-
taking by the Government to conduct a proper investigation."' 130 Finding
neither in the case before it, it sent the application back to the Chamber to
examine the merits of the case. 31
In addition to the conclusions about settlement practice that can be
drawn from the general pattern of the Court's decisions, a detailed study of a
subset of settlement decisions reveals other insights about settlement prac-
tice. The third section of this article sets out a detailed examination of set-
tlements involving applications under Articles 2 and 3. Before proceeding
to that examination, it is useful to consider briefly the fourth source of pub-
lished information about friendly settlements: publications by scholars and
practitioners.
128 id.
129 Id. at 1-2.
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4. Publications by Scholars and Practitioners
Despite the rigorous debate in the United States over the past 20 years
regarding the propriety of settlement, 32 few scholars 133 in either the United
States or Europe have addressed friendly settlements at the European Court
of Human Rights 134 in any detail, at least in English. 135 The Court's website
identifies six treatises in English published after the new Court came into
existence.136  Each of these books contains but a short section on friendly
settlement practice. 37 Nevertheless, they provide an important window into
the Court's practical implementation of its friendly settlement authority and
procedures.
When compared to practice by the Commission prior to 1998, it appears
that while the Court has the power to "provide more active assistance and, in
effect, act as a mediator,"'13- the Court has a much less active program to fa-
132 See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984); Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Whose Dispute is it Anyway?: A Philosophical and Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some
Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663 (1995).
133 A Westlaw search identifies no post-1999 article with "Friendly Settlement" in the title:
TI("FRIENDLY SETTLEMENT") & "EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS" &
DATE(AFTER 1/1/1999) (November 11, 2006) (TP-ALL and JLR databases.) A similar search in
the JLR database without the title restriction identifies 110 law review articles that contain the term
"friendly settlement." In none of the articles, however, does the author address settlements in the
European Court other than in passing. The Court's website lists theses and diploma papers on the
European Convention on Human Rights; none of the ones written in English, however, identify any
focus on settlement practice or procedure. See Council of Europe, List of theses and diploma papers
on the European Convention of Human Rights, available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/Library/annexes/memoires.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2007).
134 Similarly, there is a dearth of scholarship looking at friendly settlements in the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights. Only one article focuses on friendly settlements: Patricia E. Standaert, Note,
The Friendly Settlement of Human Rights Abuses in the Americas, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 519
(1999). Treatise coverage is even scanter than for the European Court of Human Rights. The only
treatise treatment is PASQUALUCCI, supra note 46, at 147-149 (2003).
135 The Court's website also lists six post-1998 treatises in French, four in German, two each in Dan-
ish, Dutch, Finnish, Romanian and Slovak, and one each in Icelandic, Italian, Polish and Portuguese.
Council of Europe, Library of the European Court of Human Rights, Latest commentaries and
manuals on the ECHR, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Library/COLENmanuels.html (last vis-
ited Apr. 4, 2007).
136 id.
137 In reverse chronological order, these are: LEACH, supra note 2, at 71-77; REID, supra note 31, at
14-15; CLARE OVEY & ROBIN WHITE, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 413-14 (3d
ed. 2002); MARK W. JANIS, RICHARD S. KAY & ANTHONY W. BRADLEY, EUROPEAN HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW 45-53 (2d ed. 2000); SIMOR & EMMERSON, supra note 48, at 19.014-19.015, 20.019-
20.020 (2000); CLEMENTS, MOLE & SIMMONS, supra note 1, at 75-77.
138 CLEMENTS, MOLE & SIMMONS, supra note 1, at 19.015.
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cilitate friendly settlements. The Commission often facilitated extensive ne-
gotiations, including face-to-face meetings.139 Reid notes that "[t]he Regis-
trar of the relevant Chamber will.., consult with the parties in appropriate
cases concerning the possibility of settlement. The Court does not generally
intervene in any formal or direct manner as regards making proposals."'
Clements, Mole, and Simmons are more descriptive.14 They note that the
Court "tends merely to act as a post-box; if the parties are interested in ex-
ploring a settlement, then it acts as a go-between, forwarding the respective
proposals."' 142 The initiative, however, must come from the parties. Leach
concludes that if the parties do not put forth proposals, "the Court will usu-
ally take no further action to encourage settlement. Only in very rare cases
will the Court actively become involved in facilitating settlement in a more
pro-active way." 1
43
Clements, Mole, and Simmons also note that the Court has the power to
issue a provisional view on the merits of the case. 144 They observe:
Clearly, this may be extremely influential, particularly to the respondent
state. If the opinion is strongly of the view that a violation has occurred then
a generous friendly settlement proposal would avoid embarrassment and fur-
ther costs; whereas even if the opinion is against a violation an early settle-
ment could avoid the uncertainty and prove cheaper for the state than a con-
tested hearing. 1
45
Reid, however, notes that the Court "does not.., follow the previous
practice of the Commission in giving an indication of its provisional opinion
of the merits with a view to encouraging settlements." 1
46
III. "FRIENDLY SETTLEMENTS" IN ARTICLE 2 AND 3 CASES: A SURVEY
Settlements under Articles 2 and 3 present both a convenient sample for
a detailed study of a set of friendly settlements and a challenging test case
139 See, e.g., JANIS, KAY & BRADLEY, supra note 137, at 46-52 (setting out excerpts from Giama v.
Belgium, App. No. 7612/76, Eur. Ct. H.R. and the Commission Report July 17, 1980, 21 Eur.
Comm'n Hum. Rights 73, 84-94 (1981)).
140 REID, supra note 31, at 14.
141 See generally CLEMENTS, MOLE & SIMMONS, supra note 1.
142 Id. at 19.014. Leach uses the same "post box" metaphor. LEACH, supra note 2, at 72.
143 LEACH, supra note 2, at 72. Leach suggests one area where the Court might be willing to move
stalled negotiations forward. "For example, where financial negotiations run into difficulties, the
Court may be prepared to suggest what would represent a reasonable sum for settlement of the case."
Id. (citing Koksal v. Netherlands, App. No. 31725/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001)).
'44 CLEMENTS, MOLE & SIMMONS, supra note 1, at 19.015 (citing paragraph 78 of the Explanatory
Memorandum to Protocol 11).
145 id.
146 REID, supra note 31, at 14; see also LEACH, supra note 2, at 72.
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for the practice itself. The convenience comes from both the relatively small
size of the set and the coincidence that Articles 2 and 3 are the Convention's
first two substantive articles-as easy a place as any to start a study. The
challenge comes from the Articles' subjects-the rights to life and freedom
from torture and inhuman treatment. In terms of finding an appropriate bal-
ance between justice and closure, these two subjects should be among the
most difficult subjects the Convention addresses. Surprisingly, however,
applications raising these articles settle at an above average rate. 147 Indeed,
as Table 1 indicates, applications under Article 3 have the highest settlement
rate of any convention article. In addition, between 2001 and 2003, inclu-
sive, parties settled as many Article 3 cases as the Court issued judg-
ments. 148
As Table I summarizes, between January 1, 1999, and December 31,
2005, the Court reached decisions in 147 applications under Article 2 and
303 applications under Article 3. Collectively, these 450 decisions are 6.6%
of the 6,849 total Table 1 decisions issued during that period. Given the al-
most 7000 decisions made during the study period, the Article 2 and 3 appli-
cations provide a workable starting point for a detailed analysis. Of those
450 decisions, applications raising Article 2 issues were the subject of 118
judgments and 29 friendly settlements. Applications raising Article 3 issues
were the subject of 219 judgments and 84 friendly settlements. 149 These
judgments were, respectively, 2.1% and 3.9% of the total judgments
reached. The settlements were, respectively, 2.3% and 7% of the total set-
tlements reached. Collectively, applications under Articles 2 and 3 repre-
sented only 6% of the total number of judgments reached, but 9.3% of the
total settlements reached. 150 While the overall settlement rate for all cases
under all articles was 17%, applications under Article 2 had a 20% settle-
ment rate, and applications under Article 3 had a 28% settlement rate. Thus,
in relative terms, applications under Article 2 settled at a rate that was nearly
18% higher than the average settlement rate. 151 Applications under Article 3
settled at a relative rate that was nearly 65% higher than the average.
152
'
4 7 See Table 1.
148 As indicated in Table 1, the Court issued twenty Article 3 judgments in 2001, eighteen in 2002,
and twenty-seven in 2003, for a total of sixty-five judgments. Similarly, parties settled twenty-seven
Article 3 cases in 2001, seventeen in 2002, and twenty-one in 2003, for a total of sixty-five settle-
ments.
'
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Practitioner conduct, thus, demonstrates that nothing within the subjects en-
compassed by the Articles makes settlement more difficult. 53 If anything,
the higher settlement rate for applications under these two articles suggests
that the cases are more easily settled than the average case.154
A. Published Article 2 & 3 Judgments
A brief description of Article 2 and 3 law will provide context for the
review of the Article 2 and 3 friendly settlements.
1. Article 2 Law
Article 2 states:
Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be de-
prived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court
following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by
law. 155
The case law interpreting this Article has covered a wide variety of ap-
plications. Such applications have included: "police operations; deaths in
custody; disappearances; suicides in state custody; death penalty; victims of
crime (state and non-state actors)-the duties of prevention and investiga-
tion; environmental cases; and health care, abortion, euthanasia and assisted
suicide." 156
Several paragraphs from a recent decision illustrate the typical language
the Court uses to describe Article 2's requirements:
Article 2, which safeguards the right to life and sets out the circum-
stances when deprivation of life may be justified, ranks as one of the
most fundamental provisions in the Convention, to which no derogation
is permitted. Together with Article 3, it also enshrines one of the basic
values of the democratic societies making up the Council of Europe.
153 Id.
154 id.
155 Convention, supra note 22, at art. 2(a). The text continues:
Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article when it results
from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: (a) in defense of any person from
unlawful violence; (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully
detained; (c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.
Id. While Article 2(a) permits the death penalty, Protocol No. 6 abolished the death penalty except
in time of war. Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=l 14&CM=8&DF=I 1/12/2006&CL
=ENG (1983). Protocol No. 6 first came into effect on March 1, 1985. Id. As of November 12,
2006, it had been ratified by forty-five states-all the member states except Russia. Id.
156 LEACH, supra note 2, at 183-84 (internal references omitted).
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The circumstances in which deprivation of life may be justified must
therefore be strictly construed. The object and purpose of the Conven-
tion as an instrument for the protection of individual human beings also
requires that Article 2 be interpreted and applied so as to make its safe-
guards practical and effective.
The text of Article 2, read as a whole, demonstrates
that it covers not only intentional killing but also the situations where it
is permitted to "use force" which may result, as an unintended outcome,
in the deprivation of life. The deliberate or intended use of lethal force
is only one factor, however, to be taken into account in assessing its ne-
cessity. Any use of force must be no more than "absolutely necessary"
for the achievement of one or more of the purposes set out in sub-
paragraphs (a) to (c) ....
In the light of the importance of the protection afforded by Arti-
cle 2, the Court must subject deprivations of life to the most careful
scrutiny, taking into consideration not only the actions of State agents
but also all the surrounding circumstances. Use of force by State agents
in pursuit of one of the aims delineated in paragraph 2 of Article 2 may
be justified where it is based on an honest belief which is perceived for
good reasons to be valid at the time but which subsequently turns out to
be mistaken. 1
57
In addition to the substantive obligations imposed to protect life,
Article 2 also imposes procedural obligations to conduct an effective in-
vestigation into claimed violations of the Article. 158
2. Article 3 Law
Article 3 states: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.'"' 59 While there is some overlap among
the three separate terms-torture, inhuman treatment, and degrading treat-
ment-each has its own definition and case law. 160 Article 3 has been ap-
plied in circumstances including "policing; conditions of detention; death
penalty; immigration, asylum and extradition; discrimination; child care;
corporal punishment; and medical treatment."'
6
'
... Akkum v. Turkey, App. No. 21894/93, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005).
'
58 Id. at 42.
"9 Convention, supra note 22, at art. 3.
160 LEACH, supra note 2, at 201-18.
161 Id. at 204 (internal citations omitted).
243
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Several paragraphs from a recent decision illustrate the typical language
the Court uses to describe Article 3's requirements:
As the Court has stated on many occasions, Article 3 enshrines one
of the most fundamental values of democratic societies. Even in the
most difficult circumstances, such as the fight against terrorism and or-
ganised [sic] crime, the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture
and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Unlike most of the
substantive clauses of the Convention and of Protocols Nos. 1 and 4, Ar-
ticle 3 makes no provision for exceptions and no derogation from it is
permissible under Article 15(2) even in the event of a public emergency
threatening the life of the nation. The Convention prohibits in absolute
terms torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irre-
spective of the victim's conduct.
In assessing evidence, the Court has generally applied the standard
of proof "beyond reasonable doubt." However, such proof may follow
from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant infer-
ences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact. Where the events in
issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the
authorities, as in the case of persons within their control in custody,
strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of injuries occurring
during such detention. Indeed, the burden of proof may be regarded as
resting on the authorities to provide a satisfactory and convincing expla-
nation.
In the instant case the applicants complained that during their arrest
and subsequent detention they were subjected to acts of police brutality.
Admittedly, on the day of their release from police custody, the appli-
cants bore injuries. According to the Court's case-law, "where an indi-
vidual is taken into police custody in good health but is found to be in-
jured at the time of release, it is incumbent on the State to provide a
plausible explanation as to the causing of the injury, failing which a
clear issue arises under Article 3 of the Convention."
The question which therefore arises next is whether the minimum
level of severity required for a violation of Article 3 of the Convention
can be regarded as having been attained in the instant case. The Court
recalls that the assessment of this minimum is relative: it depends on all
the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its
physical and/or mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state
of health of the victim.
In considering whether a punishment or treatment is "degrading"
within the meaning of Article 3, the Court will also have regard to
whether its object is to humiliate and debase the person concerned and
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whether, as far as the consequences are concerned, it adversely affected
his or her personality in a manner incompatible with Article 3.
As with Article 2, Article 3 also imposes the obligation to conduct an ade-
quate investigation into alleged violations. 
163
B. Article 2 & 3 Settlements
1. Article 2 Settlements
The twenty-nine Article 2 settlements listed in Table 2164 reveal several
patterns. Turkey's role presents the most prominent feature. Twenty-five of
the settlements-86% of the total settlements-occurred in cases against
Turkey. According to HUDOC, during the study period, Turkey was in-
volved in seventy-nine additional cases that reached the merits of alleged
violations of Article 2 claims. 165  This gives Turkey a settlement rate of
24%. In absolute terms, this is within one point of the 25% rate at which it
settles all of its cases. Cases arising under Article 2, thus, demonstrate nei-
ther any particular obstacle to Turkey's willingness to settle, nor any particu-
lar incentive for it to settle.
In contrast, the other three states that settled at least one Article 2 case-
the Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Portugal-settled at a rate substan-
tially higher than their overall settlement rates. Switzerland settled the only
Article 2 case against it that concluded during the study period.166 Switzer-land was involved in twenty-five decisions over that period. It settled two of
162 Bekos v. Greece, App. No. 15250/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005) (citations omitted).
' Id. at 13.
'64 HUDOC search, supra note 55, (Nov. 20, 2006) with restrictions: 1) date (01/11/1998-
12/12/2005); and 2) articles (2, 2-1, 2-2) produced twenty-eight cases. HUDOC, however, mistak-
enly omits Koksal v. Netherlands, App. No. 31725/96, Eur Ct. H.R.(2001) as an article 2 settlement.
Including Koksal leaves Table 2 with twenty-nine cases.
[Note: all dates indicated for HUDOC searches use the HUDOC dating convention:
day/month/year.]
165 A HUDOC search performed Nov. 20, 2006, using the database's "count" feature with three re-
strictions, produced a total count of seventy-nine cases. HUDOC search, supra note 55, (Nov. 20,
2006) with restrictions: 1) respondent state (Turkey); 2) conclusion ("violation of art. 2" "violations
of art. 2"); and 3) date (01/11/1998 to 31/12/2005). Adding the 25 friendly settlements produces a
total of 104 cases.
166 HUDOC search, supra note 55, (Nov. 18, 2006) with restrictions: 1) date (01/11/1998-
31/12/2005); 2) respondent state (Switzerland); and articles (2, 2-1, 2-2). After the study period,
however, Switzerland did not settle an Article 2 case. See Scavuzzo-Hager v. Switzerland, App. No.
41773/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006) (finding, among other matters, a violation of Article 2).
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those cases, for an overall settlement rate of 10%.167 Thus, Switzerland set-
tles cases against it at an overall rate substantially lower than the 16% rate
for all the member states. Its settlement of Tatete v. Switzerland168 therefore
stands out as virtually unique among the cases against it.
Over the study period, the Netherlands was involved in forty-nine deci-
sions. 169 Of the forty-nine total decisions, the Netherlands settled eight, for
a settlement rate of 16%-a rate identical to the rate for all member states.
Four of the forty-nine total decisions involved Article 2.170 The Netherlands
settled one case; another was dismissed when the applicant chose not to pro-
ceed; and the final two led to judgments against the Netherlands.17 1 The
Netherlands was thus able to settle 25% of the Article 2 cases against it, at a
rate substantially higher than both its overall settlement rate and the overall
rate for all the member states.
167 HUDOC search, supra note 55, (Nov.20, 2006) with restrictions: 1) date (01/11/1998-
31/12/2005); 2) respondent state (Switzerland); and 3) conclusion ("violation" "violations") pro-
duced twenty-three results. HUDOC search (Nov. 18, 2006) with restrictions: 1) date (01/1 1/1998-
31/12/2005); 2) respondent state (Switzerland); and 3) conclusion (settlement) produced two results.
Identical numbers come from the Court's annual Survey of Activities. According to those surveys,
Switzerland was involved in six judgments and one settlement in 2000, seven judgments and one
settlement in 2001, four judgments in 2002, one judgment in 2003, and five judgments in 2005.
ECHR Survey of Activities 2001, supra note 80, at 33; ECHR Survey of Activities 2002, supra note
58,at 35; ECHR Survey of Activities 2005, supra note 55, at 37.
168 Tatete v. Switzerland, App. No. 41874/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2000).
169 HUDOC search, supra note 55, (Nov. 20, 2006) with restrictions: 1) date (01/11/1998-
31/12/2005); 2) respondent state (Netherlands); and 3) conclusion ("violation" "violations") pro-
duced 41 results. HUDOC search (November 18, 2006) with restrictions: I) date (01/11/1998-
31/12/2005); 2) respondent state (Netherlands); and 3) conclusion (settlement) produced nine results.
One of those, however, only involved a settlement of just compensation, so it was excluded from
Table 1: Wessels-Bergervoet v. Netherlands, App. No. 34462/97, Eur Ct. H.R. (2002).
Identical numbers come from the Court's annual Survey of Activities. According to those surveys,
the Netherlands was involved in one judgment and one settlement in 1999, four judgments and one
settlement in 2000, three judgments and four settlements in 200 1, nine judgments and one settlement
in 2002, seven judgments in 2003, nine judgments and one settlement in 2004, and eight judgments
in 2005. ECHR Survey of Activities 2001, supra note 80, at 33; ECHR Survey of Activities 2002,
supra note 58,at 35; ECHR Survey of Activities 2005, supra note 55, at 37.
170 HUDOC search, supra note 55, (Nov. 18, 2006) with restrictions: 1) date (01/11/1998-
31/12/2005); 2) respondent (Netherlands); and articles (2, 2-1, 2-2).
171 Ramsahai v. Netherlands, App. No. 52391/99, Eur Ct. H.R. (2005) (finding one violation of Arti-
cle 2); Said v. Netherlands, App. No. 2345/02, Eur Ct. H.R. (2005) (finding violation of Article 3 but
no separate violation of Article 2); Aspichi Dehwari v. Netherlands, App. No. 37014/97, Eur Ct.
H.R. (2000) (striking the case off the list, by arrangement of the parties, after change in Dutch law
made applicant eligible for the relief sought from the Court and he elected not to pursue his applica-
tion); Abdurrahim Incedursun v. Netherlands, App. No. 33124/96, Eur Ct. H.R. (1999) (resulting in
a friendly settlement).
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Over the study period, Portugal was involved in 124 decisions.1 72  Of
the 124 total decisions, Portugal settled fifty-three, for a settlement rate of
43%, the highest settlement rate for all the member states. Of the 124 deci-
sions, only one involved Article 2.173 Like Switzerland, Portugal thus settled
its only Article 2 case. Because Portugal settles cases at a much higher rate
than Switzerland, however, its settlement of Cruze da Silva Coelho v. Portu-
gal174 is not nearly as unusual as Switzerland's decision to settle Tatete. 175
In addition to comparing the settlement rates of the four countries, a
comparison can be made of their respective success rates in the cases that
reached judgments on the merits. As described in the immediately succeed-
ing paragraphs, none of the four nations demonstrates any particular overall
acuity in identifying the cases in which they may prevail. A higher than av-
erage settlement rate for Article 2 cases would thus demonstrate some
heightened concern by those states with the potential for a judgment against
it.
The Netherlands was involved in forty-one judgments on the merits dur-
ing the study period. 176 Of those cases, thirty found at least one violation of
at least one article. 177 Thus, nearly three-quarters of the cases which go to
full judgment on the merits result in rulings against the Netherlands.
172 HUDOC search, supra note 55, (Nov. 20, 2006) with restrictions: 1) date (01/11/1998-
31/12/2005); 2) respondent state (Portugal); and 3) conclusion ("violation" "violations") produced
71 results. HUDOC search (November 18, 2006) with restrictions: 1) date (01/11/1998-31/12/2005);
2) respondent state (Portugal); and 3) conclusion (settlement) produced fifty-three results.
Identical numbers come from the Court's annual Survey of Activities. According to those surveys,
Portugal was involved in eight judgments and five settlements in 1999, eleven judgments and nine
settlements in 2000, ten judgments and fifteen settlements in 2001, fourteen judgments and eighteen
settlements in 2002, sixteen judgments and one settlement in 2003, five judgments and two settle-
ments in 2004, and seven judgments and three settlements in 2005. ECHR Survey of Activities
2001, supra note 80, at 33; ECHR Survey of Activities 2002, supra note 58,at 35; ECHR Survey of
Activities 2005, supra note 55, at 37.
173 HUDOC search, supra note 55, (Nov. 18, 2006) with restrictions: 1) date (01/11/1998-
31/12/2005); 2) respondent (Portugal); and articles (2, 2-1, 2-2).
174 App. No. 9388/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005).
' "App. No. 41874/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2000).
176 HUDOC search, supra note 55, (Nov. 18, 2006) with restrictions: 1) date (01/11/1998-
31/12/2005); 2) respondent (Netherlands); and 3) conclusion (violation). The search for "violation"
produces both cases in which the court found a "violation" and cases in which the court found "no
violation."
177 Result found by manually reviewing the results of the search listed in the preceding note, using
HUDOC's "notice" function.
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Switzerland was involved in twenty-three judgments on the merits dur-
ing the study period. 178 Of those twenty-three cases, eighteen found at least
one violation of at least one article. 179 Thus, over three-quarters of the cases
which go to full judgment on the merits result in rulings against Switzerland.
Turkey was involved in 783 judgments on the merits during the studyS 180
period. Of those 783 judgments, at least 723 found at least one violation
of at least one article.' 81 Thus, over 92% of the cases which go to full judg-
ment on the merits result in rulings against Turkey.
Portugal was involved in seventy-one judgments on the merits during
the study period. 182 Of those seventy-one cases, at least sixty-seven found
at least one violation of at least one article. 183 Thus, over three-quarters of
the cases that go to full judgment on the merits result in rulings against Por-
tugal. Despite Portugal's above-average willingness to settle the cases filed
against it, it goes on to lose over ten out of eleven of the cases it does not
settle.
A review of the settlement amounts listed in Tables 2 and 2a demon-
strates a wide range of values for "just compensation." In absolute terms, in
Table 2, the amounts range from a low of E3,889 to a high of €182,374, with
a mean of £73,321 and a median of C63,548.184 Table 2a indicates that in
178 HUDOC search, supra note 55 (Mar. 26, 2007) with restrictions: 1) date (01/11/1998-
31/12/2005); 2) respondent (Switzerland); and 3) conclusion (violation).
179 Result found by manually reviewing the results of the search listed in the preceding note, using
HUDOC's "notice" function.
180 HUDOC search, supra note 55, (Nov. 18, 2006) with restrictions: 1) date (01/11/1998-
31/12/2005); 2) respondent (Turkey); and 3) conclusion (violation).
In contrast, Table la, compiled from the annual Survey of Activities, identifies Turkey as the subject
of 779 judgments.
181 HUDOC search, supra note 55, (Nov. 18, 2006) with restrictions: 1) date (01/11/1998-
31/12/2005); 2) respondent (Turkey); and 3) conclusion (damage award "costs and expenses"). This
search will not produce cases in which the court found a violation against but had no occasion to rule
on just compensation or expenses.
182 HUDOC search, supra note 55, (Nov. 18, 2006) with restrictions: 1) date (01/11/1998-
31/12/2005); 2) respondent (Portugal); and 3) conclusion (violation)
183 HUDOC search, supra note 55, (Nov. 18, 2006) with restrictions: 1) date (01/11/1998-
31/12/2005); 2) respondent (Portugal); and 3) conclusion (damage award "costs and expenses").
This search will not produce cases in which the court found a violation against but had no occasion
to rule on just compensation or expenses. See, e.g., Steur v. Netherlands, App. No. 39657/98, Eur
Ct. H.R. (2003) (stating that HUDOC's "conclusion" indicating violation of Article 10 but no indica-
tion of ruling on damages or expenses.) In Steur, the applicant did not submit any claim for just sat-
isfaction. Id.
'4 As all but five of the settlements resulted in a lump sum award for damages and costs, the values
reported here for ranges, means and medians include the total of both damages and costs. See infra
Table 2, Col. K ("+EE"). Where the values announced in the court's decision were in a currency
other than the euro, they were converted to euros using the web site oanda.comError! Hyperlink
reference not valid, and the date of the decision listed in Table 2. Oanda.com, The Currency Site,
http://www.oanda.com/convert/fxhistory (last visited Apr. 12, 2007).
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the 24 cases where the applicant(s) sought compensation for an actual death
or disappearance, the values range from a low of E30,000 to a high of
E182,374, with a mean of E80,486 and a median of E68,000.185 In euros per
applicant, both overall, and in cases where the applicant(s) sought compen-
sation for an actual death or disappearance, the values range from a low of
C3,577 to a high of E182,374. 116 For the entire set of Article 2 settlements,
Table 2 indicates that, per applicant, settlements had a mean value of
647,413 and a median value of E40,000.187 For cases involving death or dis-
appearance, Table 2a indicates that, per applicant, settlements had a mean
value of 650,688 and a median value of E40,000. '
A complete comparison of the settlement values in Article 2 cases with
the just compensation awarded in judgments on the merits is beyond the
scope of this study. Nevertheless, some preliminary observations can be
made by looking at a limited data set.189 Tables 2b and 2c list the cases in
which the Court found at least one violation of Article 2 in 2005.'90 As dis-
played in Table 2c, in absolute terms, the awards run from 62,000 to
'8' Four of the Article 2 settlements involved life-threatening state actions but did not result in an
actual death. These were: Boztas v. Turkey, App.No. 40299/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004); Binbay v.
Turkey, App. No. 24922/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999); Abdurrahim v. Turkey, App. No. 33124/96, Eur.
Ct. H.R. (1999); and Tatete v. Switzerland, App. No. 41874/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2000).
The E30,000 settlement earmarked E25,000 for damages and E5,000 for legal fees and expenses. See
Eren v. Turkey, App. No. 42428/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2003). The E182,374 settlement included fees
and expenses within the total settlement figure. See Demir v. Turkey, App. No. 22280/93, Eur. Ct.
H.R. (2002).
186 Twelve of the 28 settlements involved more than one applicant. See infra Table 2, Col. E
("#/Apps").
'8' See Table 2, Col. L (("C+EE)/#/Apps.)
188 See Table 2a, Col. L (("€+€€)/#/Apps.)
'89 See also REID, supra note 3 I, at 547 (summarizing awards in eleven Article 2 judgments).
'90 Table 2b is an edited version of a HUDOC search performed November 20, 2006, with 2 restric-
tions: 1) conclusion ("violation of art. 2" "violations of article 2"); and 2) date (01/01/2005-
31/12/2005). This search produced 40 results. It should have produced all 2005 cases in which the
court found either a violation or no violation of Article 2. HUDOC search, supra note 55, (Feb. 20,
2007) with restrictions: date (01/01/2005-31/12/2005); and conclusion ("violation of art. 2" violation
of article 2"). Using HUDOC"s "notice" pages, the list was then manually winnowed first to remove
the four cases in which the court found no violation of Article 2 at all. The full text of the remaining
36 cases was then downloaded and examined in detail.
Table 2b includes judgments that HUDOC indicates were made during 2005 even if they were not
finalized until 2006. See, e.g., Bader v. Sweden, App. No. 13284/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005).
With one exception, Table 2c is identical to Table 2b. In Bader v. Sweden, App. No. 13284/04, Eur.
Ct. H.R. (2006). In Bader, although the Court found an Article 2 violation, the applicant did not
request any award. As a result, in order not to distort the median or mean case award figures, Bader
is not included in Table 2c. Its inclusion in Table 2b, however, allows its time to judgment to be
included in the overall mean and median time values.
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C510,000, with a mean of E78,340 and a median of E56,318.191 When com-
pared with the Article 2 settlements in cases involving an actual death or
disappearance (set out in Table 2a), the overall range for the judgments is
broader on both ends. Both the mean and the median value for judgments,
however, are lower than the corresponding settlement values. Table 2a indi-
cates that the mean settlement value in death and disappearance cases
(E81,528) is £3,188 higher than for judgments (E78,340). Table 2a further
indicates that the median value for settlements in death and disappearance
cases (£70,000) is £ 13,682 higher than for judgments (E56,318).
The disparity between settlement values and judicial awards is even
more pronounced when the focus shifts to the value-per-applicant. As Table
2a indicates, the per-applicant value of settlements of cases involving a
death or disappearance range from E3,577 to C182,374. In contrast, as Table
2c indicates, the per-applicant value of judicial awards in the 2005 Article 2
just compensation cases is lower on both ends; it ranges from £2,000 to
E100,000. The Table 2a mean per-applicant settlement value is £50,688-a
full E6,345 higher than the Table 2c mean per-applicant judicial award of
£34,343. A similar difference exists between the Table 2a median per-
applicant settlement value and the comparable Table 2c judicial award. The
median per-applicant settlement value is E40,000. This is E17,308 higher
than the median per-applicant judicial award (E22,692).
In sum, at least for the Article 2 settlements within the study period,
when compared to the 2005 Article 2 judgments, the respondent states are,
on the whole, paying a substantial premium to settle a case in lieu of going
to judgment. Alternatively, applicants who choose to go to judgment are re-
ceiving a substantially discounted award to what their settling counterparts
achieve. In effect, they are paying a substantial premium to get a formal
judgment. 192
In addition to considering the responding parties and settlement values,
a third set of patterns emerges when comparing the time that the parties have
taken to reach settlement with the time the court has taken to reach judg-
ment. Table 2 and its cousins list two times. First, Column F ("TI") identi-
fies the approximate time, in months, between the date that the applicant
filed with the Court (or its predecessor, the Commission) and the date the
Court approved the settlement. Second, Column G ("T2) identifies the ap-
proximate time, again in months, between the date that the Court approved
the settlement and the date that the underlying events that gave rise to the
application occurred.
'9' See infra Table 2c, Col. K. For proper comparison with the Article 2 settlements in Tables 2 and
2a, the combined total for damages and costs is used for the range, mean and median values.
192 This, of course, assumes that the respondent states were willing to settle the case at a premium
over the likely eventual judgment.
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Under Table 2, the "time between filing and settlement approval" ranges
from 24 to 114 months, with a mean time of 75 months and a median time of
76 months. The "time between underlying events and settlement approval"
ranges from 40 to 170 months, with a mean time of 106 months and a me-
dian time of 98 months.
Columns F and G in Table 2b reflect the same two calculations for the
2005 Article 2 judgments. The "time between filing and judgment" ranges
from 18 to 146 months, with a mean time of 97 months and a median time of
101 months. The "time between underlying events and judgment" ranges
from 28 to 165 months, with a mean time of 110 months and a median time
of 109 months.
As to be expected, the settled cases reached resolution substantially
sooner than the cases reaching judgment on the merits. The mean time be-
tween filing and settlement approval was 22 months shorter than the mean
time between filing and judgment. The median time for settlements was
even shorter--25 months shorter than for judgments. The mean time be-
tween the underlying events and settlement approval was four months
shorter than the mean time between the underlying events and judgment.
The median time between the underlying events and settlement approval was
nine months shorter than the median time between the underlying events and
judgment.
In conclusion, on average, applicants who settle their Article 2 cases are
likely to get a substantially higher settlement substantially sooner than those
who wait for judgment.
2. Article 3 Settlements
When compared to a set of 2005 judgments on the merits, the Article 3
friendly settlements demonstrate similar, but not identical, patterns as found
with the Article 2 settlements and judgments. Table 3 lists the 84 settle-
ments in which the applicant alleged a violation of Article 3. 193 As with the
Article 2 settlements, cases involving Turkey predominate, although at a
slightly lower rate. Turkey was involved in sixty-eight of the eighty-four
193 Eight cases appear in both Tables 2 and 3: Akdeniz v. Turkey, App. No. 25165/94, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2005); Akkum v. Turkey, App. No. 21894/93, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005); Aydin v. Turkey, App. No.
25660/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005); Gongadze v. Ukraine, App. No. 34056/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005);
Kanlibas v. Turkey, App. No. 32444/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005); Khashiyev v. Russia, App. Nos.
57924/00, 57945/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005); Kismir v. Turkey, App. No. 27306/95, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2005); and Tanis v. Turkey, App. No. 65899/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005). These eight cases represent
24% of the Article 2 judgments, and 17% of the Article 3 judgments.
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settlements. This represents 81% of the Article 3 settlements, a figure only
5% lower than the 86% of Article 2 settlements that involved Turkey. The
remaining 16 settlements are dispersed among 11 countries. Romania tops
that list, with four settlements. The Netherlands and Poland each settled a
pair of cases. Belgium, Croatia, the Czech Republic, France, Greece, Italy,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom each settled one Article 3 case.
In absolute terms, the settlement values range from a low of zero to a
high of E262,000. 194 The mean settlement value was E47,193, and the me-
dian was £30,245. In euros-per-applicant, the values ranged from a low of195
zero to a high of E188,000. The mean settlement-per-applicant was
E31,324 and the median was E24,462.
As with the Article 2 cases, a complete comparison of Article 3 settle-
ments with the corresponding judgments on the merits is beyond the scope
of this article. Nevertheless, again as with the Article 2 cases, some prelimi-
nary observations can be made by comparison with the most recent complete
annual set of Article 3 judgments. Table 3a lists the 50 cases that found at
least one violation of Article 3 during 2005.196 Table 3b lists the 46 cases
that awarded compensation for at least one violation of Article 3 during
2005.197 In absolute terms, as Table 3b indicates, the Court's just compen-
sation awards range from E2,000 to C238,000.198 The mean award is
C38,556 and the median award is C12,685. In individual terms, the Court's
per-applicant award ranges from E2,000 to £120,000.199 The mean per-applicant judgment is E21,656 and the median is E11,300.
194 See Table 3, Col. K ("E+eE").
195 See Table 3, Col. L ("E+E-Y/(#/Apps.)")
196 Table 3a is an edited version of an HUDOC search performed November 19, 2006 with two re-
strictions: 1) conclusion ("violation of art. 3" "violations of art. 3") and 2) date (01/01/2005-
31/12/2005). This search produced 80 results. In combination, the searches should have produced
all 2005 cases in which the court found either a violation or no violation of Article 3. Using
HUDOC"s "notice" pages, the list was then manually winnowed first to remove the 26 cases in
which the court found no violation of Article 3. The full text of the each of the remaining cases was
then downloaded and examined in detail. As a result of that examination, four more judgments were
removed because the full texts indicate that, contrary to the HUDOC case "notice," the Court did not
render an Article 3 judgment. These cases were: Balymez v. Turkey, App. No. 32495/03, Eur. Ct.
H.R. (2005); Eren v. Turkey, App. No. 8062/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005); H.E. v. Turkey, App. No.
30498/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005); and Muslim v. Turkey, App. No. 53566/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005).
As with Tables 2b and 2c, both Tables 3a and 3b include judgments made during 2005 even if they
were not finalized until 2006.
197 To produce Table 3b, four judgments from Table 3a were excluded because the court awarded no
compensation for the Article 3 violations, largely because the applicants had not sought them. These
cases were: Bader v. Sweden, App. No. 13284/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005); Cangoz v. Turkey, App. No.
28039/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005); N. v. Finland, App. No. 38885/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005); Said v.
Netherlands, App. No. 2345/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005).
"' See Table 3b, Col. K ("E+EE").
199 See Table 3b, Col. L ("E+EE/(#/Apps.)").
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As with the Article 2 settlements and judgments, the Article 3 settle-
ments demonstrate substantially higher average values than the correspond-
ing Article 3 judgments. In absolute terms, as indicated in Table 3, the mean
Article 3 settlement value (£47,193) is E8,637 higher than Table 3b's mean
Article 3 just compensation award (E38,556). In relative terms, the mean
Table 3 settlement value is 22% higher than the mean Table 3b judicial
award. The median values demonstrate an even greater disparity in favor of
the settling parties. In absolute terms, according to Table 3, the median set-
tlement value (£30,245) is £17,560 higher than Table 3b's median just com-
pensation award (£12,685). In relative terms, the median Table 3 settlement
value is thus 138% higher than the median Table 3b judicial award.
The disparities continue when focus turns to the per-applicant values. In
absolute terms, the mean Table 3 per-applicant settlement (£31,324) is
£9,668 higher than the mean Table 3b per-applicant judicial award
(£21,656). In relative terms, the mean Table 3 per-applicant settlement is
145% higher than the mean Table 3b per-applicant judicial award. In abso-
lute terms, the median Table 3 settlement value (£24,462) is £13,162 higher
than the median Table 3b just compensation award (£11,300). In relative
terms, the median Table 3 settlement value is thus 116% higher than the me-
dian Table 3b judicial award.
In summary, individual settling applicants receive, on average, between
38% and 116% more than applicants who win a judgment.
Unlike the Article 2 settlements and judgments, the Article 3 settlements
took longer, on average, to reach than the Article 3 judgments. The time be-
tween filing and settlement approval ranges from 18 to 115 months. 200 The
mean time is 76 months and the median is 79 months. In contrast, under Ta-
ble 3a, the 2005 judgments have taken as little as 9 months after filing to as
long as 146 months. 01 The mean Table 3a time to judgment is 67 months
and the median is 63 months. Thus, in absolute terms, the mean time to
judgment is 9 months shorter than for the Table 3 settlements, while the me-
dian time to judgment is 16 months shorter than for the Table 3 settlements.
In relative terms, the mean time to settlement is 13% longer than the mean
time to judgment. The median time to settlement is 25% longer than the
median time to judgment.
The disparity in favor of time-to-judgment is less pronounced when
consideration turns to the time between, on the one hand, the underlying
events that gave rise to the application, and, on the other hand, settlement or
200 See Table 3, Col. F ("TI").
201 See Table 3a, Col. F ("TI").
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judgment. According to Table 3, the mean time between events and settle-
202
ment is 95 months; the median is 89 months. In contrast, according to
Table 3a, the mean time between events and judgment is 84 months and the
median is 85. 203 Thus, the mean events-to-settlement time is eleven months
longer than the corresponding events-to-judgment time. In relative terms,
this is 13% higher-a figure identical to the difference between the mean
filing-settlement and filing-judgment times. The differences between the
median events-resolution times, however, are narrower. The median events-
settlement time is only four months longer than the median events-judgment
time. In relative terms, the median events-settlement time is only 5% longer
than the median events-judgment time. This is a much smaller increase than
the 25% difference in the median filing-settlement and filing-judgment
times. 204
IV. PRIME SUSPECTS AND CHANCES FOR RESUSCITATION
A. Who-Dunnit?
So who killed the friendly settlement? The short, unsatisfying answer is
"no one. It's not dead yet." But if rephrased as "who has tried to kill the
friendly settlement," a complete list of suspects would need to include the
Council of Europe, the individual Contracting Parties, the Court, complain-
ants, and attorneys for both complainants and respondents. The most likely
suspect appears to be a combination of many, if not all, of the above. The
Friendly Settlement seems to have become a victim of the efforts to stream-
line the Court's operations.
In particular, three possible reasons for the relative decline in the impor-
tance of settlements readily appear. These include: 1) the increased combi-
nation of decisions that simultaneously rule on admissibility and reach the
merits; 2) the increased efforts of the Court to reach decisions more
promptly; and 3) the elimination of the Commission and the corresponding
less active role of the Court in facilitating settlements. Together, these three
202 See Table 3, Col. G ("T2").
203 See Table 3a, Col. G ("T2").
204 The specific subject matter of Article 3 may account for some of the recent relative haste in
reaching judgments. As indicated in Table 2b, for the 2005 Article 2 cases, the mean time between
application and judgment was 97 months and the median time was 101 months. In contrast, as indi-
cated in Table 3a, the respective times for 2005 Article 3 cases were substantially shorter: a mean of
67 months and a median of 63 months. Most of the Article 2 cases involve death or disappearance,
completed actions. In contrast, many of the applicants alleging article 3 violations are currently im-
prisoned. For these applicants, prompter judicial attention would provide immediate relief from in-
human or degrading treatment in ways far superior to post-facto just compensation.
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streamlining developments have reduced both the incentives and the institu-
tional support for friendly settlements.
If these streamlining efforts have contributed to the encouragement of
judgments over settlements, it's likely that other streamlining efforts will
have the same effect. In particular, several of the provisions in Protocol 14
are likely to increase the relative number of judgments on the merits. These
include the reduction in the number of judges needed to rule on admissibility
from three to one, as well as the downsizing of chambers from seven to five
judges.
B. Improving the Prospects for Settlements
And so, whither the Friendly Settlement? to wither away completely?
It's hardly likely to occur. Indeed, there may be countervailing incentives
already at work. In particular, one aspect of Protocol 14 itself opens the
door toward increased friendly settlements. Under current practice, the
Court cannot offer the parties assistance in arranging a friendly settlement
until after the Court has found the matter admissible. Under Protocol 14,
however, the Court can offer settlement assistance at any time after an appli-
cation has been filed. If the Court were to offer settlement assistance in se-
lected cases after an initial screening for some but not all of the admissibility
205
criteria, it might breathe more life into the practice.
But for Friendly Settlement practice to truly be reinvigorated, thereby
giving the parties a meaningful opportunity to reach a consent-based version
of justice, a more active program needs to be considered. This might in-
volve some form of Early Neutral Evaluation 20 6 or mediation. In the former,
trained practitioners, familiar with the law governing the application, would
provide a non-binding, confidential, assessment of each party's case. The
parties could then use that assessment to explore settlement. In the latter,
trained mediators would help facilitate a settlement, exploring the parties in-
terests as well as helping "reality test" their assumptions about the applica-
205 For example, the Court might divide admissibility screening into two stages. An initial stage
might consider only the criteria for timeliness, exhaustion of domestic remedies, and anonymity.
Following a determination that the application passed those criteria, an offer of settlement assistance
might go out to the parties. If the parties do not settle the matter, the court could then consider the
additional admissibility criteria, and, in appropriate cases, the merits as well.
206 For a description of Early Neutral Evaluation as practiced by one group of courts in the United
States, see Alternative Dispute Resolution Program at the United States District Court for the North-
ern District of California, Early Neutral Evaluation, available at
http://www.adr.cand.uscourts.gov/adr/adrdocs.nsf/354c0e78f4ddel a6882564e 1 000be228/c72 Ia 1 36d
a682c8c882564e600603882?OpenDocument (last visited April 4, 2007).
255
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tion and their respective chances for success in front of the Court. Indeed,
the two programs could run consecutively, with an Early Neutral Evaluation
offered to the parties, who attempt to settle the matter themselves. If they are
unable, a mediator could attempt to help the parties overcome their impasse.
Many questions would have to be answered before such models, in-
creasingly familiar in American judicial practice, could be successfully
adopted to the European Court. Foremost among these would be screening,
administration, and resources. As for screening, many cases will not be ap-
propriate for an attempted negotiated resolution. Screening criteria and
screening procedures would need to be developed. As for administration,
several options exist. These could include direct supervision by the Court,
most likely through its Registry, or, alternatively, referral to an outside body.
In the latter case, the Council could either create a new institution or adapt,
in some way, the offices of the European Commissioner for Human Rights.
Finally as for funding, unless new resources are developed or allocated to
the program, it's unlikely to get much traction. Resources devoted to the
program will be seen as resources taken away from the already-overworked
Court's other necessary functions. The most likely place to start would be
with a small, short-term (e.g., three-five years after start-up) pilot program,
subject to review under specific performance and satisfaction criteria.
Whatever the outcome, it's time to consider whether Friendly Settle-
ment practice should be transformed from an ad hoc, unfacilitated process,
to a formal program with trained evaluators or mediators. Failing such a
transformation, the practice will likely remain on the books, but as an under-
utilized tool for resolving applications before the Court.
207 A list of screening questions might include: a) does the matter require the establishment of prece-
dent?; b) are there any potential areas for trade-offs?; c) are the parties willing to negotiate?; d) are
there any external pressures for agreement?; e) are there realistic timelines for completion?; and f)
are any future dealings anticipated between the parties? Additional questions could be asked to de-
termine if a mediator were appropriate. These could include: a) are emotions high?; b) have there
been poor communications between the parties?; c) have there been misconceptions or stereotypes?;
d) are party expectations too high?; e) were improper or ineffective negotiating processes previously
used by the parties?; f) are the parties at an impasse?; and g) were one or more of the parties demon-
strating repeated negative behaviors during their attempts to negotiate a resolution?
256
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TABLE 2: ARTICLE 2 SETTLEMENTS 1999-2005 COMPLETE
Applicant State File# Date #/Apps. TI T2 Art. c CC 6+EC C+E/#/Apps.
ADALI TK 31137/96 12/12/02 I 80 170 2 55,000 0 55,000 55,000
28293/95, 2, 3,5 6 8
AYDIN TK 29494/95 & 7/10/01 12 76 80 ' 112,510 0 112,510 9,376
30219/96 3
BASAK TK 29875/96 10/16/03 6 97 113 2,3,8,13 130,000 0 130,000 21,667
BINBAY TK 24922/94 10/21/04 1 75 901 2,3,5,6,8, 45,000 0 45.000 45,00010, 13
BOZTAS TK 40299/98 3/9/04 3 74 79 2, 6 61,000 7,500 68,500 22,833
CELIK TK 41993/98 7/27/04 1 74 81 2, 6 60.000 0 60,000 60,000
CRUZ DA
SILVA POR 9388/02 12/13/05 1 46 160 2,6 75,000 2,000 77,000 77,000
COEHLHO
DEMIR TK 22280/93 12/5/02 1 114 120 2,3,5,6,8, 182,374 0 182,374 182,37413
ERDOGAN TK 26337/95 6/20/02 1 92 97 2,3,5,6, 13 100.000 0 100,000 100,000
EREN TK 42428/98 10/2/03 8 64 79 2, 5 25,000 5,000 30,000 3,750
GULER TK 46649/99 4/22/03 8 57 103 2, 13 70,000 5,000 75,000 9,375
H.K. TK 29864/96 1/14/03 3 85 98 2, 3.5 60,000 0 60,000 20,000
30953/96,
I.I. TK 30954/96, 11/6/01 4 68 87 2,5 55,254 0 55,254 13,81430955/96 &
30956/96
INCEDURSUN ND 33124/96 6/22/1999 I 25 44 2.3 9,748 0 9,748 9,748
KARA TK 37446/97 11/25/03 26 70 140 2 88.000 5.000. 93,000 3,577
KOKSAL NETH 31725/96 3/20/01 2 65 98 2,3 63,548 0 63,548 31,774
MACIR TK 28516/95 4/22/03 1 93 101 2, 13 70,000 0 70,000 70,000
NO. TK 33234/96 10/17/02 1 73 113 2,3 100,000 0 100,000 100,000
2,3,5,6,9.
OGRAS TIC 3997/90 0/20/03 4 61 102 14 66,000 10,000 76,000 19.000
ORAL TK 27735/95 3/28/02 4 86 115 2 76,225 0 76,225 19,056
SEN TK 31154/96 12/12/02 1 80 170 2 70,000 0 70,000 70,000
SOGUKPINAR TK 31153/96 12/12/02 1 80 170 2 55,000 0 55,000 55,000
TATETE CH 41874/98 7/6/00 1 24 40 2, 3 3,889 0 3,889 3,889
TOSUN TK 31731/96 11/6/03 1 91 97 2,3, 5, 13 40,000 0 40,000 40,000
YAKAR TK 36189/97 11/26/02 1 67 72 2 40,000 0 40,000 40,000
YALCIN TK 31152/96 12/12/02 1 80 170 2 55,000 0 55,000 55,000
YAMAN TK 37049/97 5/22/03 I 69 83 2,3,6, 13 60,000 0 60,000 60,000
YASA TK 22281/93 6/27/02 1 108 114 2,3,5,6,8, 137,755 0 137,755 137,755
13
YURTSEVEN TK 31730/96 12/18/03 4 90 98 2,3,5,6,7 160,000 0 160,000 40,000
Mean 75 106 73,321 1,190 74,510 47.413
Median 76 98 63,548 0 68,500 40.000
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ARTICLE 2 SETTLEMENTS 1999-2005 DEATH &
DISAPPEARANCE CASES
Date #lApps TI T2 Art. E cc 
€-4-E €+CE/#/Apps.
12/12/02 1 6.8 14.2 2 55,000 0 55,000 55,000
7/10/01 12 6.4 6.8 2 3,5,6 8, 112,510 0 112,510 9,376
13, 14, 18
10/16/03 6 8.11 9.5 2,3,8, 13 130,000, 0 130,000 21,667
7/27/04 1 6.2 6.9 2, 6 60,000 0 60,000 60,000
12/5/02 9.6 10 2,3, 5, 6,8,
12/5/02 1 9.6 10 182,374 0 182,374 182,37413, 14, 18
6/20/02 1 7.8 8.1 2, 3,5,6, 13 100,000 0 100,000 100,000
10/2/03 8 5.4 6.7 2, 5 25,000 5,000 30,000 3,750
4/22/03 8 4.9 8.7 2, 13 70,000 5,000 75,000 9,375
1/14/03 3 7.1 8.2 2,3,5 60,000 0 60,000 20,000
11/6/01 4 5.8 7.3 2,5 55,254 0 55,254 13,814
11/25/03 26 6.6 12.5 2 88,000 5,000 93,000 3,577
3/20/01 2 5.5 8.2 2,3 63,548 0 63,548 31,774
4/22/03 1 7.9 8.5 2, 13 70,000 0 70,000 70,000
10/17/02 1 6.1 9.5 2,3 100,000 0 100,000 100,000
10/28/03 4 5.1 8.6 2,66,000 10,000 76,000 19,00013, 14
3/28/02 4 7.2 9.9 2 76,225 0 76,225 19,056
12/12/02 1 6.8 14.2 2 70,000 0 70,000 70,000
12/12/02 1 6.8 14.2 2 55,000 0 55,000 55,000
11/6/03 1 7.7 8.1 2, 3, 5, 13, 14 40,000 0 40,000 40,000
11/26/02 1 5.7 6 2 40,000 0 40,000 40,000
12/12/02 I 6.8 14.2 2 55,000 0 55,000 55,000
5/22/03 1 5.9 6.11 2,3,6, 13 60,000 0 60,000 60,000
6/27/02 1 9 9.62,3, 5,6, 8,
6/27/02 1 9 9.6 137,755 0 137,755 137,755
. 13, 14, 18
12/18/03 4 7.6 8.2 2,3,5,6,7 160,000 0 160,000 40,000
Mean 80,486 1,042 81,528 50,688
Median 68,000 0 70,000 40,000
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TABLE 2B: ARTICLE 2 JUDGMENTS 1999-2005 COMPLETE
A.pint Fil Stae Dte #lApps . TI T2 Art. f EE E+-6 (E(+Ef-/#1Aps.
Acar 36088/97: 38417/97 TK 5/24/05 10 91 143 2, 13 345,700 6,638 352,338 35.234
Adali 38187/97 TK 3/31/05 1 91 105 2, 11. 13 20.000 67,763 87,763 87,763
Akdeniz 25165/94 TK 5/31/05 1 129 135 2,3.5. 13 50,000 15,000 65.000 65,00
Akkum 21894/93 TK 6/24/05 3 146 151 2.3, 13, Prot. I 138,000 17,00 155.000 51,667
Ates 30949/96 TK 5/31/05 1 114 120 2.5, 13 83,500 11.723 95,223 95.223
Aydin 25660/94 TK 5/24/05 1 128 134 2,3, 13 54,500 20.000 74,500 74,50(
Bader 13284/04 SW 11/8/05 6 18 28 2,3 0 0, 0 
Celikbilek 27693/95 TK 5/31105 I 120 126 2, 13 83,500 8.000 91.500 91.50(
Demir 34491/97 TK 1/13/2005 19 98 100 2. 13 88,000 4,162 92.162 4.851
Dundar 26972/95 TK 9/20/05 1 126 156 2,13 13.500 10,000 23.500 23,50C
Gezici 34594/97 TK 3/17/05 1 100 103 2, 13 15,000 2,375 17.375 17,375
Gongadze 34056/02 UK 11/8/05 1 38 62 2.3, 13 100,000 0 100.000 100,000
ungor 28290/95 TK 3/22/2005 I 116 165 2, 13 2.000 2.000 2.000
H.Y. 40262/98 TK 10/6/05 2 93 94 2 20,000 2,485. 22.485 11.243
Haran 28299/95 TK 10/6/05 1 124 129 2 10.000 4,000 14.000 14,000
Isayeva 57947/00. 57948/00: 57949/00 RU 2/24/05 3 58 72 2. 13. Prot. 1 57.000 10,926 67,926 22,642
Isayeva 57950/00 RU 2/24/05 1 58 61 2, 13 43.710 10,926 54,636 54,636
Kacar 35838/97 TK 7/15/2005 1 101 136 2, 13 10,000 2,375 12.375 12,375
Kakoulli 38595/97 TK 11/22/2005 4 104 109 2 30,500 M000 50,500 12.625
Kanlibas 32444/96 TK 12/8/05 1 113 119 2,3 20,000 11,000 30,000 30.00
Kaplan 36749/97 TK 9/13/05 8 100 109 2, 13 72000 3,674 81.874 10.234
Kaya 33420/96;36206/97 TK 11/22/05 11 112 118 2,5, 13 15.000 8,160 23.160 2.105
Khashiyev 57942/00:57945/00 RU 2/24/05 2 58 61 2,3. 13 35,000 10,90 , 45 907 22,954
Kilinc 40145/98 TK 6/7/05 3 88 108 2 2135,.200 10 7,96 7.9833
Kismir 27306/95 TK 5/31/2005 1 122, 128 2,. 13 50,000I 14.120 64,1201 64,12C3
Koku 27305/95 TK 5/31/2005 1 121 127 2, 13 83.500 15.00 98.500 98,50
Mentese 36217/97 TK 1/18/2005 6 122 128 2, 13 602000 103000 70,000 11.667
oa 43577/ 43579/98 BU 7/6/05 4 86 108, 2 14 47.001 01 58,000 14.500
Ozgen 38607197 TK 9/20/05 3 97 103 2, 13 20,000 1,875 21,875 7.292
Rarnsahai 52391/99 ND 11/10/05 3 72 88 2 20,000 7,299 27.299 9.100
Simsek _35072/97; 37194/97 TK 7/26/05 22 102 12 2.1,1.0 1.0 23,182
Tantis 65899/01 TK 8/2/05 4 54 54 213, 5, 13 170.00( 17,9961 T8799 46.999
Togm 7619 TK 5/3112005 1 120 157 23 135(9,24 22.41 2.4
Tm-bnikovl 49790199 RU 715/2005 1 76 82 2 800 2,3151 10,3151 10.315
Turkogtu 34506/97 3/1 7/05 102 108 I0,0001 ol 10,00( 10,0010
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ARTICLE 2 JUDGMENTS 2005 AWARDS ONLY
File#
36088/97; 38417/97
Date l#/A..s.l TI I T2
5/24/05 10 191 143
Ar.
Adali TK 38187/97 3/31/05 1 191 t1051 2, 11, 13
















C I (f+tE. #/Apps.
345,7001 6,6381 352,338 35,234
tanlisil 9 ~ ~ p~, ii icannal innnl innuni
30949/96 5/31/05 1 114 120 2,5, 13 83,500 11,723 95,223 95,223
25660/94 5/24/05 1 128 134 2,3, 13 54,500 20,000 74,500 74,500
27693/95 5/31/05 I1 120 126 2, 13 83,500 8,000 91,500 91,500




























Kanlibas TK 32444/96 12/8/05 1 113 119 2,3 20,000 10,000 30,000 30,000
Kaplan TK 36749/97 9/13/05 8 100 109 2, 13 78,200 3,674 81,874 10,234
Kaya TK 33420/96;36206/97 11/22/05 11 112 118 2,5,13 15,000 8,160 23,160 2,105
Khashiyev RU 57942/00, 57945/00 2/24/05 2 58 61 2,3, 13 35,000 10,907 45,907 22,954
Kilinc TK 40145/98 6/7/05 3 88 108 2 21,500 2,000 23,500 7,833
Kismir TK 27306/95 5/31/2005 I1 122 128 2,3, 13 50,000 14,120 64,120 64,120
Koku TK 27305/95 5/31/2005 1 121 127 2, 13 83,500 15,000 98,500 98,500
Mentese TK 36217/97 1/18/2005 6 122 128 2, 13 60,000 10,000 70,000 11,667
Nachova BU 43577/98; 43579/98 7/6/05 4 86 108 2, 14 47,000 11,000 58,000 14,500
Ozgen TK 38607/97 9/20/05 3 97 103 2, 13 20,000 1,875 21,875 7,292
Ramsahai ND 52391/99 11/10/05 3 82 88 2 20,000 7,299 27,299 9,100
Simsek TK 35072/97; 37194/97 7/26/05 22 102 124 2, 13 510,000 0 510,000 23,182
Tanis TK 65899/01 8/2/05 4 5 4 12,3,5,13 170,000 17996 187,996 46,999
Togcu TK 27601/95 5/31/2005 I 120 157 2, 13 13,500 9,242 22,742 22,742
Trubnikov RU 4979099 7//2005 1 76 82 2 8,000 2,315 10,315 10,315
T-rkoglu TK 34506/97 3/17/05 1 102 108 2 10,000 0 10,000 10,000
9,969 78,340 34,34'
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ARTICLE 3 SETTLEMENTS 1999-2005 COMPLETE
Applicant State File# Date
Abdurrahim TK 33124/96 6/22/1999
ACAR TK 24940/94 12/18/01
AGGOL TK 33324/96 5/22/01
AKBAY TK 32598/96 10/2/01
ATES TK 28292/95 4/22/03
#/A l TI I[T2 Art. I C cc I_-__ (_+___#/A___
1 25 44 2,3 0 j9,748 9,748 9,748
881 931 3, 5,6, 13, 14 1188,000 188,000 188,000
791 3,5, 6,8, 13, 14,18 147,873 01 147,873 16,430
741 3,4,5,13 38,112 0 38,1121 38,112
97 114 3, 5, 6,8, 13, 14, 181 49,000 0 49.000
AVCI TK 24935/94 7/10/01 I 83 88 3. 5, 6, 13, 14 31,423 0 31,423 31,423
28293/95,AYI K 29494/9523568134
AYDIN TK 7/1001 12 76 80 2 112,510 0 112,510 9,376
and 71/18
30219/96
AYDIN TK 29289/95 7/16/02 I 73 102 3 32,015 32,015 32.015
AYGORDO TK 33323/96 5/22/01 5 56 79 3, 5, 6.8, 13, 14, 18 82,152 0 82,152 16,430
BALASOIU RO 37424/97 4/20/04 I 101 124 3,6 8,5001 0 8,500 8,50
BASAK TK 29875/96 10/16/03 6 107 113 2,3,0, 13 130,009 0 130,000 21,667
BENZAN CR 62912/00 11/8/02 1 24 32 3 12,00 0 12,000 12,000
BINBAY TK 24922/94 10/21/04 1 7 90 2,3,5,6 8, 10,13 ,000 0 5,000 5,08
BOG TIC 24946/94 7/10/01 1 83 88 3,5,6, 13, 14 29,593 029,593 29,593
BOGA TIC 24938/94 7/10/01 1 83 88 35 5, 61 13, 14 30,965 030,965 30,96-5
BOZKURT TK 35851/97 3/31/05 1 1021 115 3,6, 13 17,000 3,000 20,000 20,000
CAVUSOGLU TK 32983/96 3/6/01 1 55 6,4 3 l11,436 0 11,436 11,436
CERVENAKOVA CZ 40226/98 7/29/03 6 64 125 3,6,8, 13, 14 28,159 0 28,159 4,69
CONSTANTIN RO 49149/99 2/17/05 1 6 11 3, 13 23,000 0 23000 23,000
DEGER TK 24934/94 7/10/0 I 1 3 8 3,5,6, 135 14 31,423 0 31,423 31,42
DEMIR TK 24990/94 7/10/01 1 83 8 3,5,6, 13, 1 29,135 0 29,135 29,13
DEMR TK 22280/93 12/5/02 1 114 129 2,3,5,6, 8,13,14, 00 0 15,0 15,
DENMARK TK 34382/97 4/5/00 1 60 67 3 60,390 0 60,390 60,390
DILEK TK 31845/96 6/17/03 1 85 97 3, 5, 6, 8, 13, 14 25,00 0 25,000 25,000
DOGAN TK 24939/94 7/10/01 1 83 88 3, 5,6, 13, 14 31,42 0 31,423 31,42
DOGAN TK 32270/96 6/19/03 3 83 85 3,5, 6, 14 80,000 80,000 26,667
ERAT TK 30492/96 3/26/02 2 88 84 3 45,735 45,735 22,867
ERCAN TK 31246/96 9/25/01 1 68 73 3, 5, 6 47,846 03 47,846 47,846
ERDOGAN TK 26337/95 6/20/02 1 92 97 2, 3,5, 6, 13 100,000 ( 100,000 100,000
GELGEC TK 27700/95 3/1/01 2 69 811 3 23,5111 0 23,511 11,756
GUNDUZ TIC 31249/96 11/14/00 6 621 66 3.5 28&966 0I 28,966 4,828
GUNGU TK 24945/94 12/18/01 1 88 94 3, 5,6,13, 14 29,118 03 29,118 29,118
GIrVEN TK 31848/96 5/22/01 2 61 84 3, 5, 6, 8& 13, 14 16,430 03 16,430 85215
GUVEN TK 31847/96 5/22/01 1 61 84 3, 5,6, 8, 13, 14 16,485 03 16,4851 16,485
H.D. PO 33315/96 6/20/02 1 801 85 3,5 21588 03 2,5881 2,588
H.K. TK 29864/96 1/14/03 3 85 98 2, 3,5 60,000 0 60,000 20,000
INCE TK 33325/96 5/22/01 13 56 79 3.5, 6,8, 13, 14, 18 54,220 0 54,220. 18,073
ISCI TIC 31849/96 9/25/01 111 64 64 3, 55,6, 8, 13, 14 23,923 0 23,923 23,923
K.K.C. ND 58964/00 12/21/01 1 18 181 3 1,400 0 1,400 1,400
24849/94,
KALIN TK 2480/9 10/28/03 3 110 116 3, 5 27,000 0 27,000 9,000
24941/94_
KAPLAN TK 38578/97 10/10/02 1 80 89 3 28,000 01 28,000 28,000
KAPTAN TIC 46749/99 12/22/04 1 72 146 3, 5, 6 18,000 01 18,000 18,0003
KARAKOC TK 28294/95 11/2/04 1 115 120 3, 5, 6, 8, 13, 14, 18 48,0003 0 48,000 48,0003
KARATAS TK 24669/94 10/17/00 2 99 106 3 12,958 0 12,958 6,479
KECECI -TK 38588/97 11/26/02 1 62 119 3,5,6 15,0003 0 15,000 15,0003
KESKIN TK 40156/98 3/29/05 1 96 292 3, 5, 65 9, 10 17.0003 0 17,000 1750003
KILIC TK 42591/98 7/22/03 1 60 67 3 27,0003 0 27,000 27,0003
KINAY TK 31890/96 11/26/02 2 77 7 3, 5, 69 8, 13, 14 59,0003 0 59,000 29,5003
KIZILGEDIK TIC 24944/94 7/10/01 1 831 881 3, 5,6, 13, 14 30.508 0 30,5081 30,508
TABLE 3:
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KLAVDIANOS CR 38841/97 10/17/00 I 35 172 3,4,6, 14 7.368 01 7,368 7,368
KOKSAL ND 31725/96 3/20101 2 65 98 2,3 7.368 0 7.368 3,684
MAD! FR 51294/99 4/27/04 I 56 156 3.6 99.091 0 99,091 99,091
MERINC TK 28504195 6/17/03 I 96 167 3, 13 23,00 3.000 26,000 26.000
MOLDOVAN RO 4138/98 & 7/5105 18 99 143 3,6,8, 14 262,00 8 262,000 14,556
64320/01
N.O. TK 33234/96 10/17/02 I 73 113 2,3 100,000 8 100,000 100.00C
NOTAR RO 42860/98 4/20/04 I 73 93 3.5.6, 13 40,875 8,712 49.587 49,587
0.0. TK1 31865/96 4/29/03 2 90 112 3 30,00 01 30,008 15,00C
OGRAS TK 39978/98 10128/03 4 1611 102 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 13, 14 66.000 10,000] 76,000 19,00(]
ONDER TK 31136/96 7/25/02 1I 761 89 3 16,800 03 16,800 16,80(
ORAK TK 24936/94 7/10/01 1 83 88 3, 5, 6, 13, 14 30.965 0 30,965 30.945
ORNEK TK 41306/98 7/15/04 2 76 79 3,602 13, 14 46,000 4,000 50,000 25,000
OZBEY TK 31883/96 1/31/02 I 68 894 3,6 15,245 0 15,245 35,24
OZCAN TK 29856/96 4/91/02 I 76 81 3,5,6, 14 30,490 0 30,490 30,49
Ozkur TK 37088197 3/403 2 70 76 3,5, 14 14,00 2,500 16,500 8,25
P.K. PO 37774/97 1/6/03 I 91 107 3, 5,8 5,45 0 0 5,45 5,454
24942-
PARLAK TK 494/94 7/10/01 83 88 3.5,6. 13, 14 32,948 0 32,948 32,948and
25125194
SAHLI BM 38707/97 1/9/01 I 39 75 3.8 0 0 0
SAH O TK 37415/97 6/2204 1 83 102 3, 13 23,000 3,000 26,000 26,00
SAKI TK 29359/95 10/30/01 I 73 89 3, 13 8,3840. 8,385 8,38
SARI TK 41926/98 7/31/03 I 62 72 3,5,6, 13 23,000 0 23,008 23,00(
SENSES TK 24991/94 7/10/01 1 23 88 3, 5,6, 13, 14 28,677 0 28.677 28167-
SULEMANOVIC IT 5 / 118/02 16 30 32 3,13 161,294 0 161,294 10,08157575/00
Sunnetci TK 28632/95 7/22/03 1 96 107 3 21,500 3,50 500 25900(
TATETE CH 141874/98 7/6/00 1 24 40 2, 3 3,889 0 3,889 3,88S
Temnel TK 37047/97 7/13/04 1 85 90 3, 8,13 6,000 016,0001 6,00(
TOKTAS TK 38382/97 7/29/03 11 92 101 3, 6, 14 26,000 026,000 26,00(
TOSWN TK 31731/96 11/6/03 4 91 97 2,3.5,13,14 40.000 0 40,000 40,00(
YAMAN TK 37049/97 5/22/03 1 69 83 2.3,6, 13 60,000 8 60,00 60,00(
YASA TK 22281/93 6/27/02 I 108 114 2,3,5,6,8,13,14, 137,755 0 137,755 137.75118
YILDIZ TK 32979/96 7/1 6/02 1 71 111 3,6 30,489 0 30,489 30,48i
YILDIZ TK 28308/95 4/22/03 4 93 108 3 30,500 030,500 7,62!
YURTSEVEN TK 31730196 12/18/03 4 90 98 2,3,5,6,7 160,000 0160,0001 40,00i
Z.W. UK 34962/97 7/29/03 1 81 96 3,13 20,9120891 108,991
Z.. T 735 490 1 84 16 3 30,490 30,490 30,491
51
Weber: Who Killed the Friendly Settlement? The Decline of Negotiated Res
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2007
ARTICLE 3 JUDGMENTS 2005 COMPLETE
Akdogdu TK 46747/991 10/1805 72d 9,72(
Akkum TK 21894/93 6/24/2005 3 146 151 2,3, 13, Prot. 1 138,000 17,000 155,000 51,6W
Alver EST 64812/01 11/8/05 1 65 114 3 3,000 0 3,000 3,00(
Asian TK 48063/99 10/20/05 1 80 96 3,6 10,000 2,370 12,370 12,37(
Aydin TK 25660/94 524/2005 1 128 134 2, 3,13 54,500 20,000 74,500 74,50(
Bader SWE 13284/04 11/8105 6 18 28 2,3 0 0
Becciev MOL 9190/03 10/4/05 1 31 31 3,5 5,000 1,200. 6,200 6,20(
Bekos GR 15250/02 12/13/05 2 44 91 3 20,000 0 20,000 10,00(
Biyan TK 56363/00 2/3/2005 1 67 95 3,6 9,000 2,315 11,315 11,31!
Cangoz TK 28039/95 10/4/05 1 124 124 3.5 0 0
Chamaiev K 36378/02 4/12/2005 13 30 30 3,5, 13 122,500 6,000 128,500 9,88
Dalan TK 3858597 6/7/2005 I1 115 118 3, 13 8,000 1.370 9,370 9,37(
Dima TK 27309/95 7/120/05 1 124 130 3. 13 20,000 8,000 28,000 28,00(
Fedotov RUS 5140/02 10/25/05 1 46 52 3, 5,6, Prot. 1 7,400 800 8,205 8,20(
Gongaze UK 34056/02 11/8/2005 1 38 62 2.3,13 100,000 0 10000 100,00(
Gultekin TK 152941/99 5131/05 4 68 108 3,6. 13 50,000 1,500] 51,500 12,875
Gunaydin TK 27525/95 10/13/05 2 126 59 3.6 10,000 2,000 12,000 6,00(
Gturbu TK 26050/04 11/10/05 1 17 1110 3 3,000 1,285 4,285 4,M8
Ma BUL 44082/98 6/9/2005 1 82 88 3, 5 4,000 2,000 6,000 6,00(
Kanlibas TK 32444/96 12/8/05 1 1134119 3 230,000 10,000 30,00 30,00(
Katakas TK 43925198 6/28/05 2 82 [130] 3,6 5,000 2,815 7,815 3,M0
Karalevicius LITH 53254/99 4/7/05 1 _78 ] 9 3, 5, 8 12,000 1,000 13,000 13,00(
Karayigit TK 63181/00 9/20/2005 1 58 79 3. 13 15.000 2,815 17.815 17,8 1
Kehay'ov BUL 41035/98 1/1812005 1 84 85 3, 5 2,000 1,50 3,500 3,50(
Khashiyev RUS 57942/00; 2/24/2005 2 58 61 2,3, 13 35.000 10,907 45,907 22,95,
57945100
Khudoorov RUS 6847/0 11I/8/05 1 45 169 3, 5.6 50,0001 01 50,000 50,00(
Kilic TK 35044197 6/28/05 1I 115 1331 3. 13 15,000 1,500] 16,500 16,50(
Kismir TK 27306/95 5/31/2005 I 122 128 2,3, 13 50,000 14,120 64.120, 64,12(
Kurcay€ TK 24040105 11110105 1 16 16 3 3,000 1.285 4.285 4,28!
Labzov RUS 62208/00 6/16/2005 1 60 61 3 2,000 2.00 2.00
Mathew ND 24919/03 9129/05 1 26 46 3 10,000 3.000 13,000 13,00(
Mayzit RUS 63378/00 1/2012005 1 54 54 3.5 3,000 0 3.000 3,00(
ModvnR 431 19: 7/12/05 7 96 142 3,.8 238,000 0 238,000 34,00(
N Io FIN 1388 7/64320/01
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TABLE 3B:
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ARTICLE 3 JUDGMENTS 2005 AWARDS ONLY
25165/94 5/31/05 I 54 54
46747/99 10/18/05 1 72 94
21094/93 6/24/2005 3 146 151
64812/01 11/8/05 1 65 114
48063/99 10/20/05 1 80 96
2.3,5, 13
3




Aydin TK 25660/94 5/24/2005 1 128 134 2, 3, 13 54,500 20,00 74,50 0000
BGekn MOL 9190/03 10/4/05 1 31 31 3. 5 5000 1,200 6,200 6,200
Bekos GR 15250/02 12/13/05 2 44 91 3 20,000 0 20,000 10,000
Biyan TK 56363/00 213/2005 1 67 95 3,6 9,000 2,315 11,315 21,315
Chamaiev GEO & RUS 3637802 4/12/2005 13 30 30 3,5, 13 122,50 0 6,000 128,500 9,885
aan TK 3855/97 6/7/2005 1 112 118 3, 13 8,000 1,370 9,370 9,370
Diman TK 27309195 7/20/05 1 124 130 3, 13 20,00 8,000 2,005 8,000
Fedotov RUS 5140/02 10/25/05 1 46 52 3,5, 6. Prot. 1 7,400 800 8,200 8,200
Gongadze UK 340561/02 11/8/2005 I 38 62 2.3, 13 100,000 0 17,815 100,005
Gultekin TK 52941/99 53105 4 68 108 3.6. 13 50,000 1,500 
5 1,500 12,875
Gtmaydin TK 27525/95 10/13/05 2 126 159 3,6 10,000 2,000 12,000 6,000
Gurbuz TK 26050/04 11/10/05 1 17 110 3 3.000 1,285 4,285 4,285
H.. BUL 44082/98 6/92005 1 82 88 3, 5 4,002 2,00( 6,000 6,000
K atlibas TK 32444/96 12/8/05 1 113 119 2,3 20,000 10,000 
30 000 30,000
Karakas TK 43925/98 6/28/05 2 82 13 0 3, 6 5,000 2,815 
7,815 3,908
Karaevicius LITH 53254/99 47/05 1 78 99 3, 5, 8 12,00( 1000 13,000 13,000
Karayigit TK 63181/00 9/20/2005 1 58 79 3, 13 15,000 2.815 
17,815 17,815
Kehayov BUL 41035/98 1/18/2005 1 84 85 3, 5 2,000 1,500 
3500 3,50C
Khashiyev RUS 57942/00; 2/242005 2 58 61 2, 3, 13 35,000 10,907 
45,907 22,954
57945/00
Khudoyorov RUS 684702 11/8/05 _ :5 _ 9 _ 3,5,6 50,00( 50,000 50,000
Kilic T IC 35044/97 6/28/05 1 115133 1 3, 13 15,00 01 1,500: 
16,500 16,500
Kismir TK 27306/95 15/31/2005 _I 122 128 2,3, 13 50,00 0 14,120 64,120 64.12 .
Kurcay TK 24040/05 111005 1 16 16 3 3,000 1,285 
4,285 4 285
Labzov RUS 62208/00 6/16/2005 1 0 61 3 2,000 0 2,000, 2,000
Mathe ND 2491903 9/29/05 _1 2 6 3 10,000 3,000 
13,0001 13,000
Mayzit RUS 637"0 120/2005 1 54 54 3, 5 3,000 0 
3,0001 3,000
Modvn RO 4 1 13/8 71 2/05 7 96 142 36,8 238,000 
238,000 34,000




























2/3/2005 10 88 91
10/4/2005 1 9 11
1/25/2005 1 78 106
8/2/2005 4 54 04
11/10/2005 I 20 24
11/10/05 1 17 24
Mean
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